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CHRONOLOGICAL INFORMATION
1850-1900--Progressive Housing Movement
1899--Ebenezer Howard formed the Garden City Association
1903--First garden city, Letchworth, was begun.
1920--Raloh Borsodi homesteaded in Suffern, New York.
1923--Regiona1 Planning Association of America established.
1932--Tugwell professor of economics at Columbia and part
of Brain Trust.
1932--Borsodi 's first homestead for others, at Dayton.
Jan., 1933--Roosevelt asked Wallace, Tugwell, and Wilson to draw
plans to reorganize Department of Agriculture into
an instrument of national planning. Tugwell became
Undersecretary of Agriculture.
May 12, 1933--Emergency Relief Act, creating the Federal Emergency
Relief Administration (FERA) providing relief funds
to the states, which distributed them through state
relief organizations.
Aug. 23, 1933--Division of Subsistence Homesteads was officially
organized in the Department of the Interior.
Senator Bankhead's subsistence homesteads proposal, added on to the
National Industrial Recovery Act, as Section 208 of Title II (S25 million
appropriated for this). Harold L. Ickes, as Secretary of the Interior,
was designated to carry out Section 208. He already had other parts of
Title II (the Public Works Program). Public Works Program was headed by
Robert D. Kohn. Ickes named M, L. Wilson as head of Subsistence Home-
steads Division.
Oct. 1933--First loan granted to Ralph Borsodi 's homestead pro-
ject in Dayton, Ohio. Also controversial community
for stranded coal miners at Reedsvil le/Arthurdale,
West Virginia (Clarence Pickett and Eleanor Roosevelt)
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Dec. 2, 1933--Formation of Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corpora-
tion, an action agency for the Division of Subsis-
tence Homesteads. Subsidiary local corporations were
formed for most of the projected homesteads, and this
parent corporation held the local stock issued and
thus had ultimate control over their policies. This
corporation device met four needs: (1) acquire, hold
and dispose of title to land, buildings, (2) to
enter contracts with borrowers, purchasers and
architects, (3) to assure local administration and
support, (4) to remove aura of paternalism and
differentiate subsistence homesteads from relief
projects.
Dec. -Jan. '33, '34--Three other stranded worker communities to Subsis-
tence Homesteads Division: Cumberland Homesteads,
Crossville, Tennessee, Tygart Valley Homesteads,
El kins , West Virginia, Westmoreland Homesteads,
Greensburg, Pennsylvania (none of the four ever
succeeded).
Feb. 1934--Congress prohibited any expenditure for the manufac-
ture of postal supplies outside of Washington, D.C.,
thus killing plans for a postal furniture factory
at Arthurdale, on the grounds that it would eventu-
ally destroy private enterprise, or to government
control of all industry. This decided that the
government might build subsistence homesteads and
hope for industry to come, but it could not provide
industry.
Feb. 1934— Harry Hopkins Administrator of the Federal Emergency
Relief Act, created the Division of Rural Rehabilita-
tion and Stranded Populations, for the purpose of
returning stranded agricultural workers to farms and
making special loans to make them self-sustaining.
Laurence Westbrook was made head of the Division of
Rural Rehabilitation (he had worked in Texas and
organized the Texas Cotton Co-operative Association).
This differed from Subsistence Homesteads in that in
many states no communities were even planned—relief
funds of the state corporations were lent to individ-
ual farmers. Also, all rural rehabilitation com-
munities were planned for relief clients. They had
a dual economic base—cooperative farms and cooper-
ative village industries. The FERA initiated 26 com-
munities of varying sizes—almost all were actually
constructed by the R.A.
Mar. 15, 1934--Comptroll er General John R. McCarl ruled that the
local Subsistence Homesteads corporations would have
to deposit their borrowed funds with the U.S.
Treasurer and use standard disbursing and accounting
procedures. This nullified one of the primary pur-
poses of the corporate device—decentralized admin-
istration, which was at the foundation of Wilson's
program.
Mar. 19, 1934—Wilson reluctantly outlined a new plan of administra-
tion, with complete control over the local projects
by the Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation.
The local corporations would act as an advisory
board.
May 12, 1934— (Ickes, who didn't favor decentralization, put pres-
sure on Wilson and his staff.) On this date, Ickes
abolished all control by local corporations and com-
pletely federalized the subsistence homestead program,
leaving the projects more open to newspaper criticism
(local papers had early favored them, because of
leading citizens' sponsorship). (Borsodi brought
suit against the government. Refused to be fed-
eralized and won.)
May 1934— Ickes moved Charles E. Pynchon from the Public Works
Administration to the Division of Subsistence Home-
steads to be business manager of the Federal Sub-
sistence Homesteads Corporation. Upon resignation
of Wilson in June, Pynchon became the new Director.
Under new organization, a Planning Section was es-
tablished to take the lead in initiating new projects,
rather than local groups. A Construction Section
and an Operations Section which handled administra-
tive problems and directed the project managers.
June 30, 1934— End of Wilson's work in Division of Subsistence
Homesteads.
Nov. 1934— Ruling by the Solicitor of the Department of the
Interior, saying Section 208 specifically provided
aid for redistribution of population in industrial
centers— not farmers. Also questioned legality of
stranded workers' communities. This meant that the
subsistence homesteads' program would have to be
restricted to industrial communities.
Nov. 1934--Ickes tried to make a deal with the Department of
Agriculture, by which he would turn over to Wallace
his reclamation, erosion control, and subsistence
homesteads programs for the Department of Agricul-
ture's Bureaus of Roads, Forestry and Biological
Survey. Hoped to be rid of subsistence homesteads
and have all the conservation activities. He then
hoped to lure Tugwell from the Department of Agri-
culture and create for him the office of Undersec-
retary of the Interior, so he could direct a co-
ordinated conservation program. Wallace declined
the exchange of agencies.
By 1935, the sense of emergency and despair was ebbing--the honeymoon of
the New Deal was almost over.
Feb. 1935— Comptroller General challenged the legality of
nearly all the expenditures of the local corporations
(1 year earlier), ruling there was no authority for
their existence and that they hadn't complied with
Section 208 and government procedures.
Apr. 30, 1935--Roosevelt by executive order and under very broad
authority granted in the Emergency Relief Act of
1935, established the Resettlement Administration
under Tugwell, who also retained his position as
Undersecretary of Agriculture. Functions of the R.A.:
(1) resettlement of destitute or low income families
from rural and urban areas, including establishment
of communities in rural and suburban areas; (2) con-
tinue the whole, confused submarginal land program,
emphasizing reforestation, erosion control, flood
control, and recreational development. Later amended,
authority for land development included "any other
useful projects" giving Tugwell almost unlimited
authority in selecting projects; and, (3) rural
rehabilitation program—power to purchase land, use
eminent domain, improve and develop land, and sell
or lease with or without the privilege of purchasing
any land so held.
Apr. 30, 1935--Roosevelt transferred the land program of the FERA
to the RA.
May 7, 1935—McCarl ruled that Division of Subsistence Homesteads,
not having been extended by new legislation, would
automatically go out of existence June 16, 1935.
Hay 15, 1935--Roosevel t, by Executive Order 7041, transferred all
property and assets of Division of Subsistence Home-
steads to the newly created R.A. Its surplus funds
were transferred to the R.A.
June 1, 1935--Roosevelt moved the Land Policy Section of the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Administration to the R.A.
June 30, 1935--The Rural Rehabilitation Division of the FERA was
given to Tugwell
.
Although Tugwell wanted to continue the state corporations as an adminis-
trative device, the Comptroller General ruled the R.A. funds could not
be granted to local corporations. Agreement between R.A. and states led
to 37 states turning their funds over to the R.A. in 1935, with provision
they be spent in the states that relinquished them. Eight states refused,
but cut off from federal support they had to agree or become defunct.
Despite the accomplishments of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads and
the FERA in community building over a 2-year period, the R.A. inherited
the task of more than one half the construction work, selecting the
majority of the settlers, almost all the important managerial work within
the completed communities, and of selling or otherwise disposing of each
community.
In line with the previous work of the FERA, Tugwell set up completely de-
centralized organization for most of the R.A. program, dividing the
country into 11 regions. Offices also in each state and most counties-
necessary to rehabilitation program with loans and supervision. Suburban
resettlement was controlled from Washington. His administrative organiza-
tion was criticized—instead of four main divisions for four main tasks:
(1) rural relief, (2) land utilization, (3) rural resettlement, and (4)
suburban resettlement, Tugwell created 12 divisions. Personnel of R.A.
soon numbered over 13,000.
The R.A. and W.P.A. were both relief agencies and were tied to the same
funds from the Emergency Relief appropriation of 1935. Further, the R.A.
was committed by law to use relief labor under WPA regulations. Land
utilization projects were approved only when WPA laborers were available.
The largest number of R.A. communities were agricultural. The Rural Re-
settlement Division initiated over 100 rural projects, 32 of which were
communities— some resettled or individually scattered farms, others on
contiguous tracts of land, etc. Lake Dick, Arkansas and Terrebonne
Parish, La. were two large cooperative farming efforts.
Oct. 1935--Construction began on the greenbel t towns.
Dec. 1935--Eighteen industrial homesteads, inherited from
Subsistence Homesteads Division were complete.
March 11, 1936--Senator Warren Barbour of flew Jersey introduced a
resolution which called for an investigation of the
R.A.'s expenditures and its projects past and future,
selection of tenants and purchasers, etc. Tabled,
but then asked for R.A. to provide the Senate with
a full account of its work.
Hay 12, 1936--Tugwell submitted report.
June 20, 1936--Bankhead corrective bill became law, permitting the
R.A. to make payments to local governments in lieu
of taxes, also establishing the state's political,
civil, and criminal jurisdiction over R.A. projects.
This bill followed the Bound Brook suit because of
no taxes.
Sept. 1936— R.A. announced curtailment of its community program
to projects already planned. (Meant little, as there
were lots of those.
)
Dec. 31, 1936--Tugwell resigned from R.A. and Department of Agricul-
ture, and the R.A. by executive order became part of
the Department of Agriculture. Tugwell wanted this
to insure its future.
End of 1936— Tugwell resigned from R.A., succeeded by Dr. Will W.
Alexander, chosen by Tugwell earlier as Deputy Admin-
istrator. Alexander headed both the R.A. and Farm
Security Administration until 1940. Calvin Benham
Baldwin, one of Tugwell 's assistant administrators,
headed the F.S.A. from 1940 to 1943, continuing
Tugwell 's pol icies.
Sept. 1, 1937— Henry Wallace established the Farm Security Admin-
istration to carry out the tenant-purchase program,
and the F.S.A. absorbed the R.A. with the personnel
unchanged.
Tugwell 's short lived Planning Division, whose personnel was nonrural
,
(1) advised against part time farming as a means of raising living stan-
dards, (2) stressed the small economic importance of handicrafts and the
greater possibilities of cooperative enterprises, and recommended some
completely cooperative farms as social experiments. Most of all, the
Planning Division questioned the whole policy of loans as a means to
rehabilitation, instead asking for grants and frank subsidy to an already
overburdened group. Loans were a "dubious insistence on pioneer virtues."
The R.A. never had wide public support for its programs. Tugwell believed
in wide delegated executive powers to give leeway to planners and experts.
He disdained Congress. Congress finally had its day.
Oct. 1935—Construction began on greenbelt towns
Sept. 1937— First units occupied at Greenbelt
May 1938— First units occupied at Greenhills
June 1938— First units occupied at Greendale
U.S. Housing Act of 1937--provided for the clearance of slums and the
construction of public housing for families of low income who were un-
able to get adequate private housing at an affordable rent.
June 30, 1938—USHA bulletin issued, Relocation of Site Occupants ,
U.S.H.A. Bulletin No. 10, June 30, 1938, Revised
April 3. 1941.
CHAPTER I
THE REGIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful
of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new
order of things.
--Machiavelli
The Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA), formed in
1923, offered an alternative to the then-emerging metropolitan form.
This alternative had validity in the 20's, and some feel that with the
racial, urban and environmental crises we have experienced in the in-
tervening years, it still offers a viable solution in social reconstruc-
tion.
World War I caused a housing shortage, especially in armament and
ship-building centers, forcing the government to build or supervise the
building of several thousand dwellings for war workers' families. A
housing crisis following the war and the collapse of the private building
industry, produced a turning point in American housing policy. Unlike
European countries, who had for many years developed supplemented housing
programs, the United States government was ill-equipped to take on this
responsibility.
Progressive era housing reformers had fought for restrictive
legislation in order to raise standards of housing built for low-income
groups, claiming that commercial builders produced poor quality products
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for these people. However, after the war, the restrictive legislation,
which could only raise costs further, failed to pertain any longer, as
new housing simply couldn't be produced under it. The postwar housing
crisis, directly following the federal housing experiment, focused
attention upon the role of government in housing in this country and
brought a host of proposals for direct government assistance.
Maintaining that the physical and social characters of cities
were influenced by the regional distribution of population, resources,
and institutions, the RPAA considered city planning inseparable from
regional planning, and saw both in relation to definite community
objectives.
Regional planning came to the United States before the end of
the nineteenth century, and was practiced in the form of metropolitan
commissions, in Boston. These were set up to supply water, sewage, and
park facilities for the many small cities and towns in the metropolitan
area, so this form of regional planning was truly metropolitan planning,
the antithesis of the RPAA's concept.
Regional planning in the rest of the country followed in the
1920' s , responding to the frantic pace of urban growth and its spillover
into the suburbs, by providing such things as more road access, greater
water supply, and other measures that assured continued growth. This
sort of regional planning was sometimes carried out by a county and
other times by a special district, often representing ad hoc cooperation
between various local communities. Occasionally, as in New York, it was
conducted by private groups. In any of its structural forms, however,
it was still basically city planning applied to an extended area of the
suburban metropolis, supported by the power elite who wanted to protect
urban property values. At any rate, whether intentionally or not, this
form of regional planning both fostered continued growth and increased
urban land values. As Joseph L. Arnold, an historian has commented,
No commission presented plans which aimed at diverting the
growth of metropolitan cities because their sponsors never
questioned the assumption that bigger was better. The j
regional commissions were supposed to facilitate growth.
The RPAA felt that metropolitan planning was not regional planning,
and further, by aiding growth and congestion, metropolitan planning
compounded the problems it supposedly solved. Mumford claimed that
metropolitan planning lacked any conception of a norm, unless it was
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growth for its own sake.
Because of its opposition to the detrimental effects of metro-
politan areas on social structures, the RPAA has been falsely accused
of anti-urbanism, and even of providing the intellectual rationale for
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suburban sprawl through its advocacy of decentralism. In actuality,
the members of the group were concerned about what they believed to be
the disintegration of urban values caused by this sprawl.
Far from possessing only spiritual and philosophical overtones,
the RPAA never completely accepted the garden city as the only answer,
and worked hard at forging new ideas which could answer some of the
social problems, rather than relying on such pat solutions. The commun-
ity planning efforts of the RPAA were an attempt to coordinate physical
and social planning by finding and integrating into one program the
variables affecting urban residential environment.
The regional city notion involved far more than the creation of
garden cities or new towns--it implied the preservation of the integrity
of small towns and villages as well as the reconstruction and renewal
of metropolitan areas. Therefore, the regional city, in the terms of
the RPAA's idea, should not represent one single form or population
density, but a flexible, regional balance of population, resources,
and institutions.
The RPAA used Ebenezer Howard's garden city not as a model, but
as a useful springboard to further their theories about a new urban
structure—one in which unit development incorporated most necessary
attributes of urban life as opposed to a more fragmented metropolitan
structure. Optimum size would be ascertained by function and by social
or community goals determined by each individual city.
The historic Lowell, Massachusetts experiment, sponsored by the
Massachusetts Homestead Commission, which was Jeffersonian in approach,
obviously played a large part in influencing the members of the RPAA.
The Commission believed that both private, single-family detached
houses as well as exposure to nature were sources of physical and moral
well-being. Its members felt that each family should have a garden plot,
and persuaded the legislature to set up city agriculture and horticulture
schools for the education of the new residents. The Commission was con-
vinced that with proper instruction, supervision, and "if need be, some
compulsion," families living in state financed homes could appreciably
increase their incomes through intensive garden cultivation. 4
The Commission, as did each succeeding housing reform group,
looked to Europe, New Zealand and Australia, for models on how govern-
ments should handle the problem of congested cities with poor living
conditions, and sharply criticized the United States for being among
the minority of nations whose governments did not actively aid in in-
creasing the supply of good, low-cost housing, either through tax exemp-
tion, government housing, or low-interest loans. The hope was, through
the state funded experiment in Lowell, to prove that suitable dwellings
could profitably be built within the means of low income workers, thereby
encouraging private capital to participate.
The membership of the RPAA came from various professions. As a
result, each member was able to contribute a unique viewpoint to the
philosophy of the group. Some of the members follow.
Charles Whitaker
From 1913 until 1927, Charles Whitaker edited the Journal of The
A nerican Institute of Architects, and sought to lead architectural thought
away from the city beautiful concept by encouraging a new breed of socially
conscious writers with new planning ideas that emerged during World War I.
It was through Whitaker and his magazine that the core members of the
Regional Planning Association of America became acquainted and initially
shared their ideas on planning.
The housing movement of the Progressive Era which had been impor-
tant in social reform, was now in the position of a conservative, estab-
lished professional organization. Whitaker rekindled the reform idealism
dropped by the Progressive housing reformers and helped to start a new
housing movement by encouraging a new generation of reformers which cham-
pioned constructive housing legislation.
At the beginning, Whitaker and the members of the RPAA embraced
the garden city idea, which was, briefly, Ebenezer Howard's 1898 scheme
to build new towns rather than adding further population to the large
cities. Each garden city was to be surrounded by a wide greenbelt to
inhibit population growth beyond a predetermined point and to reunite
town and country. Like Edith Wood, Whitaker was particularly interested
in the principles of the single tax movement that Howard included in his
plan--with all the land in common ownership, the entire community would
benefit from the land value appreciation that accompanies urbanization
and which had theretofore profited speculators.
Whitaker sent Frederick Ackerman to England to study the large
scale housing projects being built there and in publishing his reports,
Whitaker began an organized campaign to influence the government by
getting professional support for wartime housing. The objective grew
through the series of articles, "What Is A House?," into the belief
that the government should assume the responsibility for providing
housing, military or not, when the private market fails to do so.
Edith Elmer Wood
Long before World War I, Edith Elmer Wood, a housing economist,
had fought against restrictive housing legislation, feeling that the
government was the only solution to the problem of sufficient credit
provided at a suitably low rate of interest for building houses. She
prepared bills in 1913 and 1916 for Congress to authorize low-interest
loans to limited-dividend building associations, but neither was enacted.
In the 1920's, Mrs. Wood worked for a government aid-to-housing
program which included the establishment of a National Housing Commission
enabled to loan funds to local communities and limited-dividend companies
for housing projects approved by her proposed state housing and town
planning commissions. She proposed using postal savings deposits for
housing loans to individuals and proposed amendment of the Farm Loan
Act and the Federal Reserve Act to permit national banks to supply
housing loans. Mrs. Wood wanted state housing and town planning
commissions as well as local housing and town planning boards which
would encourage limited-dividend and cooperative housing as well as
the formulation of a municipal housing program possibly containing
public housing.
The United States failed to show in its national census what
proportion of its population was living in crowded or over-crowded
conditions which was a source of frustration to her, when other coun-
tries were maintaining this practice.
In 1917, she wrote the sixth installment of the "What Is A
House?" series for the Journal of the American Institute of Architects
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for editor Charles Whitaker, and through this, framed the housing debate
from the RPAA's point of view.
Along with Henry Wright and Clarence Stein, she campaigned for a
"constructive housing program" in which the government or publicly sup-
ported cooperatives and limited dividend organizations would construct
quality housing on a massive scale for low income people. This was
unlike restrictive legislation where public authorities prevent the
building of bad houses through enforcement of minimum standards, in
that it required public initiative to build adequate housing units.
Wood also argued that private enterprise would not adequately house the
unskilled worker.
Edith Wood favored Henry George's Differential or Graded Tax, for
controlling land values where either the whole real estate tax is put on
8land, buildings being exempt, or the tax rate on land is higher than
that on buildings. In either case, the practice of holding land idle
for a rise in value is discouraged by making its retention too costly,
and building is encouraged because it produces revenue without adding
to the tax burden.
Wood pointed out that a number of Canadian cities had adopted
the graded tax system, and a few in the United States, Seattle and
Pittsburgh among them. However, she realized that the practice in
Germany where the cities controlled land values by owning a large part
of the land and leasing it for building purposes, thus preventing
speculation, was unlikely to be adopted in the United States, requiring
both a complete change in attitude and radical constitutional amend-
ments. The English garden city idea, with land acquired at agricultural
prices and the community-created increased values saved for the community
instead of going to the developing company or individual speculators,
was considered by Mrs. Wood with more enthusiasm. She realized that it
would be far more difficult in the United States than in England, where
such a plan is not contrary to custom, to build a town whose homes should
be on leasehold land.
Mrs. Wood was very impressed with the writings of Raymond Unwin,
which dealt with the underlying principles of town planning and decentral-
ization, and became convinced of the validity and desirability of this
approach.
Clarence Stein
Clarence Stein, born in Rochester, New York in 1882, studied
first at Columbia School of Architecture and then in Paris at the
Ecole des Beaux-Arts.
His affiliation with the Hudson Guild, a West Side social
settlement, in 1919 was influential in directing his attention to social
architecture and the problems of New York's poor. As chairman of the
Hudson Guild Farm Committee, Stein spent many weekends at the Netcong,
New Jersey farm, whose dining hall he designed. He also was secretary
of the City Planning Committee of the City Club, a civic betterment
organization. From 1923 to 1926 the RPAA held many weekend meetings
at the farm, and used the City Club in New York for luncheons.
Stein had early on learned about the economic problems of
providing decent housing, which cost more than most workers could afford,
through his job as secretary of the Housing Committee of the Reconstruc-
tion Commission. This committee differed sharply with the policy of the
Progressive era, in that they felt that minimum standards legislation
to control commercial builders had no relevance to the existing situation.
Stein's committee instead sought means by which to increase the supply
and reduce the cost of housing, including establishment of a central state
housing agency and local housing boards in communities of 10,000 or more
people, a constitutional amendment permitting state housing credit, and
an enabling act authorizing cities to acquire land for the purpose of
engaging in housing operations.
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The committee favored large scale building of houses as opposed
to scattered small individual units, and sought to unite housing with
transportation and industry, turning to the English garden city as a
model. From this point of view, housing improvement was linked to
industrial decentralization and limitations upon the size of cities.
Through his participation on the Housing Committee of the Reconstruction
Commission, Clarence Stein became familiar with economic and philoso-
phical attitudes towards housing similar to the ideas of Edith Elmer
Wood and Catherine Bauer.
In 1921, Stein assumed the chairmanship of the Committee on
Community Planning of the American Institute of Architects (CCP-AIA),
to which several charter members of the RPAA also belonged. Although
more limited in scope, focusing on community olanning programs without
the explicit regional emphasis, the CCP-AIA paralleled the RPAA through-
out the 1920' s , publishing its views in the Journal of the AIA, edited
by Charles Harris Whitaker.
Stein was a supreme organizer, and as the RPAA's president, sat
indisputably at its center. He was a good judge of character and a
skilled administrator, capable of getting the best from the people
around him. Unlike almost everyone else in the RPAA, Stein knew how
to operate politically, and his colleagues recognized the importance
of his leadership to the group's success. He was an excellent appraiser
of both people and ideas, and never permitted himself to lose sight of
the broader social goals through over-emphasis on any single detail.
He had a keen sense of public issues, and as the chairman of the Commis-
sion for Housing and Regional Planning, he established acceptance of the
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widespread need for new housing for the lower income groups who were
ill-served by private enterprise. He also showed the need of large
scale enterprise, both private and public, to do the job effectively,
and pointed out that money at low interest rates would be far more
effective in reducing costs than any conceivable economy in construction.
Until his influence began to be felt, the housing movement in
New York had confined itself almost exclusively to restrictive legisla-
tion. The notion of having the state supply the capital and even take
the initiative in condemning land for housing purposes and subsidizing
the lowest income groups, would never have been considered a possibility.
In his position on the Commission for Housing and Regional Planning,
Clarence Stein also pointed to the need to build on open land, in order to
eliminate wasteful street patterns, provide open spaces, reduce density,
and drain off sufficient population from the central areas to lower the
grossly inflated land value based on standards which were dehumanizing
to the poor.
Without Stein's initiative, New York State's leadership in
publicly aided state housing in the late 1920
' s would not have come
about. Without his leadership, and the ideas developed by the RPAA, the
Roosevelt administration probably would not have developed the comprehen-
sive national housing policy that it attempted, nor would it have built
the Greenbelt towns in 1934. Finally, the germ of a new town policy
would not have been produced in Washington.
Clarence Stein's work as architect and planner, while largely of
a private nature until the Greenbelt project, had as its ultimate aim
the use of the power and wealth of the government to coordinate all the
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component parts that create communities and to make them serve public,
rather than private ends. Stein looked on these experiments in housing
as Ebenezer Howard had with the garden city, as a proving ground for
methods that would later be used, if successful, on a far wider scale.
Henry Wright
Frederick L. Ackerman and Henry Wright had both worked as archi-
tects on the United States Shipping Board's War Housing, under Robert
D. Kohn, who later became first head of Public Works Administration
housing under President Roosevelt in 1933. Sometime after the war, Mr.
Kohn, already associated professionally with Stein, brought Wright and
Stein together. That meeting began their close association—a partner-
ship which lasted for a decade. Clarence Stein and Henry Wright each
possessed special abilities which complemented those of the other.
Henry Wright was trained as a landscape architect, and while he had
many ideas, he was never rigidly committed to even his best ones, if
a seemingly better suggestion was made. In contrast to Stein, Wright's
was a middle class household, which made him sympathetic to and able
to interpret the needs of his new clients in low income housing. (Stein,
a bachelor, was accustomed to apartment life in Paris or New York.)
Wright even lived with his family at Sunnyside during its early days,
experiencing first hand its advantages and drawbacks. He recognized
the necessity of lowering the cost of housing while doing a better job
of building it, and felt that the type of control exerted over the
overall pattern could contribute to both ends. Wright was an avid
chess player, and compared the game to planning, claiming that chess
developed one's abilities to be ready with alternative solutions, able
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to think many moves ahead, coordinate many variables, and never,
ultimately, exhaust all of the possibilities.
As in any close partnership which works well, it is difficult
to assign credit to one or the other, or even separate their ideas.
By training, however, Wright was the planner, with a very good eye
for site planning and grouping, while Stein was predominantly the
architect. When they dissolved their partnership, however, Stein
turned his skills increasingly to planning. Stein and Wright's colla-
boration was so crucial to the organization that their eventual split,
followed a few years later by Wright's death, contributed to the RPAA's
gradual decline in the early thirties.
Frederick Ackerman
One of the first architects Whitaker drew into his circle was
Frederick Ackerman, who was deeply under the influence of Thorstein
Veblen, and felt the need for fundamental social change. Ackerman was
a true skeptic, and played the devil's advocate for Stein and Wright.
Mumford described him as something of a wet blanket, but never outside
Q
the group. Ackerman, using an austere Veblenian analysis for American
social and economic institutions was doubtful of the prospects for com-
munity planning without a fundamental reconstruction of those institu-
tions and their values. He thought neither the architectural technician
nor any other specialist could use his skill for maximum social benefit
as long as individuals were able to capitalize technological gain in
terms of price. In his opinion, urban growth was a response to pecuniary
imperatives, and efficient and socially productive land use had been sub-
ordinated to speculative gain. Therefore, the central issue for the
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social architect and planner was to transfer urban development from
the "sphere of the interplay of self-regarding actions into the province
9
of social design and control."
Ackerman's anti-speculative bias was extreme, and was very
influential in the RPAA's program which sought to create a new insti-
tutional framework through which the social architect and planner for-
mulated urban physical and social goals--an administered society,
rather than one controlled by profit-seekers. The RPAA refused to
equate community progress with physical growth and rising property
values.
Lewis Mumford
In 1919, Lewis Mumford met Whitaker in Washington, D.C., and
the latter introduced him to both Stein and Benton MacKaye. He was
still in his twenties when Whitaker drew him into his growing circle
of reform urbanists, but had already established correspondence with
the Scottish biologist and town planner, Patrick Geddes. In an article
for the Nation in 1919, Mumford suggested,
The housing problem, the industries problem, the transportation
problem, and the land problem cannot be solved one at a time
by isolated experts, thinking and acting in a civic vacuum.
They are mutually interacting elements, and they can be
effectively dealt with only by bearing constantly in mind
the general situation from which they have been abstracted.
In addition to a youthful zeal, Mumford was interested in his-
tory, able at architectural and social criticism, and possessed a com-
pelling literary style which the RPAA used to communicate its ideas.
Mumford served for years as the secretary of the RPAA. Although
lacking the specialized education of the other members, he was nevertheless
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a strong regionalist and the one who could synthesize the individual
members' ideas into an organized philosophy. He was the RPAA's most
eloquent spokesman, and through his prolific writing gained recognition
and support for its innovative programs.
Benton MacKaye
An experienced forester, disciple of Thoreau, and an ardent
naturalist, Benton MacKaye helped forge the regional ideal into
practical, working programs. Born in Stamford, Conn, in 1879, MacKaye
attended Harvard, and following his graduation in 1901, he became a
forester and received his M.A. in 1905. He taught at Harvard for
several years, and worked in the United States Forest Service both
in Washington and in the field, during one of the high points of the
conservation movement.
MacKaye helped to draft a bill introduced in the Congress to
conserve, through public ownership and control, the essential resources
of Alaska and he spent a year (1918-1919) as a specialist in coloniza-
tion, in the U.S. Department of Labor on a plan to settle groups of
returning soldiers on the land. (This plan was abandoned)
MacKaye envisioned a national program of community building
offering preservation and efficient utilization of the national domain,
full employment, and the complete reorganization of the farming, lumbering,
and mining industries. The idea was unique for its unification of com-
munitarianism with conservationist ecology and technicism.
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Agriculture under this system is handled through the community
unit as against the isolated farm unit. Not only is each farm
prepared for use through initial cultivation of the soil and the
erection of farm buildings, but the community itself is organized
for cooperative action in marketing produce, purchasing supplies,
obtaining credit, and in providing for social as well as economic
needs. Hence a portion of land is usually reserved at the center
of each community for the location of cooperative warehouses,
stores, and banks, as well as for schools and churches. At or
near this center a demonstration farm may be established on
which pure-bred cattle and other stock are raised and sold at
cost to settlers; and this farm may also be used as a training
school for incoming settlers. 10
In order to establish lumbering on a sound economic basis and
do away with migratory labor, MacKaye emphasized long range planning and
timber culture like the state owned forests in Europe. Each timber area
would have to supply a continuous, predetermined annual yield, thereby
permitting the establishment of permanent communities for the men and
their families, as opposed to migrant camps. MacKaye felt that in the
case of mining coal, communities could be established in connection with
an agricultural unit, which would replace the typical mining camp.
To carry out the plans for the permanent reservation of govern-
ment agricultural, forest, and mineral land and water rights, a national
board was needed to cooperate with states, survey and classify lands for
most efficient use, acquire private land through condemnation, build and
supervise colonies, and organize the cooperative facilities within them.
Nothing like MacKaye's plan for systematic community building, conserva-
tion, and resource development ever came about, but it foreshadowed a
goodly amount of the New Deal's program. In effect, MacKaye was forging
a link between the conservation movement and the community planners.
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MacKaye quit the government and went into retreat to concentrate
on how to best contribute to the improvement of the habitability of the
country. In October of 1921, he contributed an article to the Journal
of the American Institute of Architects , in which he outlined the project
for an Appalachian footpath from Maine to Georgia. It was entitled "An
Appalachian Trail: A Project in Regional Planning." This unusual sort of
contribution to a professional architectural journal was possible due to
the encouragement and editorial policy of Charles Whitaker. MacKaye con-
ceived this new trail as the backbone of a whole system of wild reserva-
tions and parks linked together by feeder trails into a huge system to
maintain the primeval and rural environment. In the development of this
Appalachian preserve, MacKaye saw a means of designing a better urban
pattern for the flow of population that was already making the whole
coastal area from Boston to Washington into a "conurbation," as Patrick
Geddes called it, more recently to be termed, by Jean Gottmann, "megalopolis.
Through the AIA article and his friendship with Whitaker, MacKaye
became a part of the circle which soon was the RPAA. Later in his career,
MacKaye became a regional planner for the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
(1934-1936), and the Rural Electrification Administration (1942-1945).
One of MacKaye 's most important contributions to the RPAA was to
provide ideas which modified the majority of the members' city-minded
approach, causing a better balance to be struck in their regional concepts.
His regional planning studies for the New York State Housing and Regional
Planning Commission contrasted the planning of small-scale communities
on the older, self-sufficient pattern, and the planning of modern communi-
ties, where autonomy and balance must be achieved within a network of much
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wider cooperation. His ideas culminated in an outline of the "Regional
Planning" number of the Survey Graphic magazine, (Kay 1925).
Stuart Chase
Stuart Chase, who spent years studying social waste, promoted
conservation of energy and resources and his specialty, economic planning.
At the time other members of the RPAA were in Washington, Chase was in-
volved in the government's temporary economic planning apparatus. He
began to meet with the RPAA to share in all of their new ideas. Chase
predicted that little would come of his idea of economic planning, during
the depression, but it would surface again during subsequent economic
crises. He believed that regional planners would have to use economic
planning in order to establish a new settlement pattern. Besides the
obvious function of guiding investment to specific locales, economic
planning could help set national or regional policies to insure that
citizens received a greater share of the wealth they helped to create.
As a member of the technical staff of the first American trade union
delegation to the Soviet Union, he studied the Gosplan, their first
five-year plan. His positive assessment of that plan appeared in Soviet
Russia in the Second Decade
, a book he edited with Rexford Guy Tugwell
and Robert Dunn in 1928.
Catherine Bauer Wurster
Catherine Bauer (who married William Wurster in 1940) was for
several years the executive secretary of the RPAA, though she did not
join it until 1931 and never fully accepted the concept of regionalism.
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Bauer's Modern Housing , was a widely read work in the field both
in the U.S. and abroad. She was vice president of the National Housing
Conference and a member of the advisory committee of the Division of
Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment. She taught at Harvard and the
University of California.
A study of shopping centers, undertaken by Catherine Bauer and
Clarence Steii, with Radburn, New Jersey in mind, was finished too
late to be of use there, but served later as the basis of Greenbelt's
successful commercial center.
On another Stein project, Valley Stream, Catherine Bauer carried
out a detailed study of social, economic, and governmental conditions in
communities near the selected site. This project, which was never built,
was thought by Stein to be an important step toward the development of
12
the Greenbelt towns, and ultimately toward new towns in America.
When Mrs. Bauer joined the ranks of the New Deal in the United
States Housing Authority, some members of the RPAA were very disappointed,
feeling that she had sacrificed her belief in the naturally interdisci-
plinary quality of their program by focusing on only one aspect of it.
John Irwin Bright
A Philadelphia architect, John Irwin Bright (1869-1940) was the
first chairman of the CCP-AIA, and duplicating the cycle of others who
would later form the RPAA, he entered the group through the pages of the
JAIA. He had previously chaired the Special Committee on Housing and
Transportation for the Philadelphia chapter of the AIA, which Whitaker
felt had broken new ground in their reports acknowledging the
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interdependence of environmental elements. When Bright's successor,
Stein, began publishing reports in 1924, the CCP's unofficial secretary,
Lewis Mumford, was asked to draft them.
Alexander Bing
Alexander M. Bing, a shrewd and experienced real estate developer,
accustomed to handling large enterprises, was sympathetic to Stein's
ideas. At the height of his business success, Bing, having genuine public
concern, put his abilities at the service of housing improvement. The
ultimate purpose of Bing's support was to build a garden city as a demon-
stration of all he and Stein believed. Without his practical cooperation,
Stein would probably never have gone so far in community design.
Bing headed a limited dividend company, the City Housing Corpora-
tion (CHC), which built both Sunnyside Gardens and Radburn. Although
somewhat different in background and temperament from the rest of the
RPAA members, Bing, with his business experience and enthusiastic support,
was important to the group. Before World War I, he and his brother had
amassed a fortune by building luxury apartment houses in New York City,
and by buying up properties abutting the railroad rights-of-way, antic-
ipating their increase in value when the trains switched from steam to
electricity. During the war, Bing worked for the Housing Department of
the U.S. Shipping Board, where he became interested in low-income housing,
and Stein persuaded him to devote his energies to housing in a philan-
thropic and practical manner.
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Inside the RPAA
The RPAA made up in intensity what it lacked in numbers—at no
time were there as many as twenty members. A core of members met at
least two or three times a week for lunch or dinner, and occasionally
somewhat more formal meetings were held over a weekend at the Hudson Guild
Farm in Netcong, New Jersey, for strenuous, lengthy discussions. (The
members brought their wives, and under the guidance of Benton MacKaye,
they were one of the first groups to revive the traditional Appalachian
folk songs and square dances.) During the first few meetings officers
were elected, bylaws and a constitution were prepared, dues assessed, and
committees were appointed. Most of these arrangements were short lived,
however, as the group realized that they would remain small and focus on
self-education rather than propagandizing. Friendship and a sense of
community, springing from their generally shared vision of how things
could and should be, held the group together rather than a program or
bylaws. In fact, the membership avoided codifying their beliefs, or even
defining them too narrowly as they felt there must be room for individual
variances within the group. Therefore, Catherine Bauer, who did not
embrace regionalism, could participate quite easily, sharing other beliefs,
and exchanging ideas, without being subjected to a group dogma. The
diversity was attested to by Mumford who pointed out that the members
couldn't even agree on the size of a region. Stein originally thought
in terms of the "state" or the "region," with the latter being very vaguely
defined in his own mind, and MacKaye, to Mumford's horror, thought in con-
1 o
tinental terms, often speaking fondly of the Appalachian Empire.
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Raymond Unwin, the British planner, was a tremendous influence on
the RPAA's thinking on economics and site planning of residential neigh-
borhoods. Stein and Wright went to see the garden cities and suburbs
which Unwin had helped design in England in 1924, and while there,
visited both Unwin and Ebenezer Howard. Unwin 's Nothing Gained by Over-
crowding , a pamphlet published in 1912, demonstrated to Stein and Wright's
satisfaction, that lower building densities returned as much to the in-
vestor as higher densities. The economic waste represented by streets
was the key to Unwin's theory, as they were the most expensive as well
as the least satisfactory form of open space. Unwin developed his ideas
of low density, large scale building in the British war housing commun-
ities and in the garden city of Letchworth, and Stein and Wright later
used the technique.
The RPAA exemplified solidarity drawn from commonly shared but
diverse ideas. According to Stuart Chase, "we were mildly socialist though
not at all communist; liberal but willing to abandon large areas of the
free market in favor of a planned economy. So we were not doctrinaire
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socialists. We were open-minded; kind of Fabian Socialists'- Most of
the members put their theories into books, articles, and practical
demonstrations such as Sunnyside Gardens and Radburn, two experimental
residential developments designed by Stein and Wright. However, while
these projects were synonymous with the RPAA in most peoples' minds, they
were only a part of the total theoretical picture with which the associ-
ation concerned itself.
23
Sunnyside Gardens and Radburn
Sunnyside Gardens and Radburn represented the effort of the RPAA
to build an American garden city as a step towards their central idea to
reorient the entire social basis of urban development through regional
reconstruction and planning. Sunnyside, which was a preliminary exercise
in neighborhood planning and housing, was also significant in that it
provided a model for limited dividend housing projects, inexpensive housing
which exemplified improved housing standards.
Mixing different sorts of dwelling units together around a large
open green or an intimate court was an innovative social experiment,
while the variety of buildings added aesthetic appeal as well, when com-
pared to the monotony of subdivisions. The courts were designated for
communal use with deed restrictions.
After the completion of Sunnyside Gardens in 1928, the City Housing
Corporation began its garden city, Radburn, New Jersey. Even before the
depression caused the bankruptcy of the CHC, the garden city goal was
abandoned, and Radburn was relegated to the status of a suburb, although
a unique one.
At Radburn, freed from New York's inflexible platting, Stein and
Wright designed a neighborhood unit comprised of superblocks--large, ir-
regularly shaped blocks penetrated by short dead end lanes. These cul de
sacs protected houses from through traffic and ended in a large interior
park with walkways meandering through the rest of the neighborhood, by
the school, the swimming pool, and stores. Using Olmstead's and Vaux's
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example in Central Park, Radburn's vehicular and pedestrian traffic were
almost completely separated, with bridges or underpasses separating foot-
paths from the roads they crossed. With the large blocks, the total
savings in road construction and utility connections roughly equalled the
cost of Radburn's interior parks. Thus, Radburn's residents paid the
same price for their homes and parks, walkways, and lanes as other people
paid for comparable subdivisions without Radburn's amenities.
In the realm of social planning, Radburn provided the first full
demonstration of Clarence Perry's neighborhood unit. Perry consulted on
Radburn at an RPAA conference in the fall of 1927. Building by neighbor-
hood units reflected the RPAA's concern with fostering the sort of viable
social life which existed in some urban neighborhoods and small towns,
which they felt was threatened by increased urban congestion and suburban
sprawl. Radburn's neighborhoods each revolved around its own elementary
school and shopping center, and comprised several interconnected super-
blocks.
The RPAA was significant both for its efforts to formulate the
principles of good residential design and for its concern with reducing
building costs at every possible point. Wright and Stein analyzed in
exhaustive detail the cost factors at Sunnyside. Wright demonstrated
that every new technological development in the internal structure added
costs which resulted in a further cramping of the space, and since tech-
nological progress was inevitable, the RPAA felt it was even more necessary
to reduce costs by planning houses, streets, and utilities in a single,
unified operation.
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But in spite of the extensive cost analyses and economies of standard-
ization, mass purchasing, and unified operations, Sunnyside houses turned
out to be more expensive than those of the speculative developer. The
possible economies in site planning were thwarted by the refusal of the
borough engineer to allow a modification of the gridiron system. And the
six percent dividend rate of the City Housing Corporation was, though lower
than the commercial market, not low enough to be of use to manual and
clerical workers. More important, Stein and Wright had not considered
the overhead of large scale operations in their calculations—an overhead
which sometimes cancelled out the economies.
Community planning was favored by the members in order to have a
good physical basis for a closer civic feeling among residents, but they
had no concrete ideas for implementing this. Related to community organi-
zation was the role played by the development corporation, and once again,
the membership could not agree. However, there was a feeling that some
sacrifice of efficiency should be made in the interest of democratic
participation, and that the residents needed training in community admin-
istration, as they would become apathetic and resentful of the company if
they had no form of self-government.
The kernel of the RPAA's program was the cooperation of the social
architect and planner in the design of large scale group and community
housing, financed to some degree by low interest government loans, and
directed toward the creation of the regional city. Sunnyside and Radburn
were conceived as first steps toward the fulfillment of this program, but
despite the hopes of the RPAA, they did not restrain metropolitan expan-
sion or transform the regional city from an idea to a controlling factor
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in American urban development. The two towns did represent the RPAA's
idea of large scale social architecture which accommodated the full range
of needs of a twentieth century urban population, and were later drawn
upon by English new town planners as well as the New Deal programs.
One of the toughest problems for the RPAA was the stimulation of
industrial development and what tack to pursue in choosing types of
businesses for a balanced population. Stein indicated the difference
between skilled and heavy industry wages, pointing out that if large
numbers of low paid workers settled in the garden city, industry would
have to subsidize their housing or raise their wages. It was also noted
that trade unions would probably resist decentralization because of the
obstacles it created for labor organization.
There was also conflict over the most desirable policy for educa-
tional facilities in the proposed town. One point of view stayed with
the existing system of public education, while another favored at least
one modern, progressive school to attract desirable population groups to
the community. The latter opinion, offered by Mumford, aroused a general
dissent, as most members felt that this policy would lead to class
divisions within the new residents.
All of these problems remained live issues throughout the RPAA's
programs, were not resolved in the Radburn project, and were found again
in the 1930
' s in the community programs of the Division of Subsistence
Homesteads and the Resettlement Administration under Rexford G. Tugwell
.
Throughout the 1920' s the RPAA pressed for establishment of finan-
cial mechanisms to channel government capital into the housing market to
aid income groups which could not obtain satisfactory service from lending
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and building institutions. Clarence Stein did much toward this end
through his chairmanship of the New York State Commission of Housing
and Regional Planning. Stein was aided by Mumford who surveyed various
forms of government aid to housing in practice in Europe, by Wright,
who prepared a regional report on New York State in 1926, and by MacKaye,
who conducted studies of the economic flow from raw material to finished
product. As Stein said,
The standard that the public has required for its own protection
has gradually risen. The ability of the individual to pay for
that standard has diminished. Thus there has steadily grown up
this divergence—this ominous parting of the ways— between the
standard of house set by the community—the adequate house—and ,-
the inadequate incomes of those that cannot dwell in that house.
The Committee for Housing and Regional Planning (CHRP) proposed
the creation of a State Housing Board with supervisory powers, and a
State Housing Bank which would finance the limited dividend companies.
However, the New York State Housing Law of 1926 eliminated the housing
bank, which would have supplied low interest capital, thus eliminating
any possibility that housing would be supplied in any significant
amount for low and middle income groups by non-speculative means.
As it turned out, New York became the only city to take advantage
of the State Housing Law. This resulted in the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America's Amalgamated Housing Corporation, a group of six
apartment houses in the Bronx accomodating 303 families and surrounding
an interior garden court, and three additional projects which followed.
The cooperative organization at the Amalgamated houses sponsored a
kindergarten, a library, a gymnasium, and tea rooms, as well as two
cooperative stores to serve the tenants.
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This concern for the domestic, cultural, and recreational needs
of tenants was similar to a limited version of the social goals of the
community planning program of the RPAA. In nurturing the growth of
the regional city, the association hoped to spread what MacKaye described
as the "community of definite social structure, developing within certain
17
geographic confines around a common civic purpose.
Some members were greatly impressed with Oswald Spengler's
historical criticism, The Decline of the West
,
{Mumford used it for the
backbone of his article "Culture Cycle and City Planning"). Spengler's
end of the culture cycle, the domination of the megalopolis and the
sacrifice of the inner life to technical proficiency, appealed to
1
R
Mumford and MacKaye. Mumford indulged in romantic splurges of enthu-
siasm for such ideas as French regionalism, with its dedication to the
revival of medieval provincial culture, and MacKaye was enthusiastic
about anything ruddy, hearty, individual, and particularly New England
oriented, such as rustic small villages full of idiosyncratic individual-
ists. Spengler's over-simplified denouncement of large cities, his
claim that they are culturally sterile, and that their residents are
traditionless, influenced Mumford to produce florid treatises which
were vulnerable to critics of the RPAA by seeming completely unrealistic
and hysterical. This was unfortunate, in that the basic theme of cities
and civilization cycles was not necessarily wrong, but Mumford's and
MacKaye's approach to stating the problem lessened the possibility of
their proposed solutions being taken seriously by the general public.
Through labeling the members of the RPAA as antiurban and romantic
agrarians, their critics effectively pushed the group's views out of the
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realm of possibility. John Friedmann and William Alonso are typical
of the status quo attitude when they say,
...Neither have we included the writings of regionalism, a form
of cultural philosophy which flourished in the 1930's but is now
widely regarded as an oddity, at least in the United States with
its exceptionally fluid social patterns. 19
The RPAA saw this fluidity as a symptom of cultural disintegra-
tion, with the megalopolis taking the place of the country, draining
it of its variety of cultures and individual attractions—its regions.
Metropolitan planners saw to it that streets were widened, buildings
made higher, subways extended, suburban areas subdivided, therby ex-
panding the metropolis and its monetary values, assuring the continued
dominance of the established financial and political nucleus. The RPAA
was not attempting to push people back into a homesteading, pioneer
sort of existence, but rather sought comtemporary architectural solutions
to city problems, relying heavily on modern technological theories to
improve the quality of life. In addition to better home life, the RPAA
felt that the garden city with its smaller regional educational institu-
tions could offer a better system of education than the megalopolitan
system of mass instruction in crowded institutions. A more active par-
ticipation in civic affairs was always an aim and a necessary factor
in the success of the garden city, or regional city, and finally, a more
organic relation between industry, living, and the immediate environment.
The RPAA envisioned a new culture which would begin with a migration
from the metropolis into stable and balanced communities. As part of
their use of modern technology mentioned earlier, the automobile, which
presented a huge problem in the congested urban centers, was looked on
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as potentially supplying access to communities which had been abandoned
when their former inhabitants migrated to the industrial towns located
on railroad lines and rivers. Another technological advance was in-
expensive long distance power service, which meant that industries could
locate where they pleased, rather than close to traditional power sources.
With technological advances supporting a new migration away from the
urban centers, the justification for metropolitan growth on a technical
and industrial basis was no longer valid. There was now a choice due to
this new mobil ity--continued urban sprawl or planning new regions of con-
trolled development.
Elements of the RPAA's Program
Garden Cities
Although the members of the RPAA embraced ecological planning and
the garden city, they did not completely agree with Ebenezer Howard's
belief in the concept as a cure-all. They wanted more variety in city
size and layout, but they did utilize many of Howard's ideas, including
greenbelts to prevent the usual city growth patterns, and common owner-
ship to eliminate speculative pressures and reduce the cost of housing
and community facilities. Howard's garden city also presented the con-
cept of industrial and residential balance, self government, and a sense
of the town in touch with its surrounding country environment. Howard
conceived of garden cities regionally, and proposed a cluster of ten
grouped contiguously to be called "social cities," which is related to
the RPAA's "regional cities," connected by rapid transit. As Howard put
it,
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Each inhabitant of the whole group, though in one sense living in
a town of small size, would be in reality living, and would enjoy
all the advantages of, a great and most beautiful city; and yet
all the fresh delights of the country—field , hedgerow, and
woodland— not prim parks and gardens merely—would be within a
very few minutes' walk or ride. 20
The garden city idea, based on municipal ownership of land and
long-term rentals instead of private ownership, was designed to control
residential property values by limiting growth and by returning the afore-
mentioned appreciation in value back to the community. The hope was that
the population would be attracted to the new cities by low rents, less
congestion, and a pleasant environment. Constructive housing legisla-
tion to use public funds for low income housing was strongly opposed by
realty speculators and investors, and labeled socialism. Congress feared
public housing so much that when it finally passed the measure for war
housing, the legislation stated that the housing units would be sold
after the war, and a month after the armistice Congress halted work on
all projects that were less than 75 percent complete. Thus, most of the
proposed units were never built.
Town! ess Highways
In order to prevent the auto's disastrous effects found in the
urban centers, Benton MacKaye used Radburn, where the community and auto
were segregated, as a model for road planning. Using the railroad as an
analogy, MacKaye suggested that the "townless highway" have limited
access at strategic points, rather than the usual unlimited, haphazard
system of intersections. He pointed out that the railroad, throughout
large portions of the country, located most of the major industrial towns,
and that the highway was blindly creating still another system, threatening
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the primary types of environment by its aimless sprawl with the accompany-
ing wayside development known as the "motor slum." MacKaye argued that
the motor slum in the open country was as bad as the worst urban indus-
trial slum, and that highways going through the hearts of cities and
towns, making every crossing a grade crossing, were unsafe as well as
unsightly.
The townless highway, as proposed, was to be a motorway in which
the adjoining towns would be in the same relationship to the road as the
residential cul-de-sacs in Radburn were to the main traffic avenues.
Regional planning with this point of view would save both the local com-
munity and the open waysice environment, and give proper access to the
wild places, having left some to visit through locating towns at definite,
logically spaced points off the main road. The highways would have all
the services motorists might need, like gas stations and restaurants, but
nothing more, thereby eliminating the need for any cars to enter a city
unless it was their destination. Public ownership of all abutting property
would abolish approaches to the main highway except at certain points,
and billboards and other forms of roadside advertisement would not be
allowed. Of course, MacKaye was forecasting the modern high speed free-
way, but the modern manifestations differ from his townless highway,
especially in their penetration of urban areas for through traffic.
MacKaye intended for the townless highway to stimulate the growth of
the distinct community, compactly planned and limited in size, like the
old New England village or the modern Radburn. This involved avoidance
by the highway of the small town or village and its approach via a side
lane or two.
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The highway was to be used only for passenger traffic, with other
express highways to be built for motor freight traffic. In short, MacKaye
sought to utilize a definite national highway policy to guide people
into appropriate communities for furthering the cultural growth, and not
21
merely the industrial expansion, of American civilization.
To increase the city sprawl into suburbia through uncontrolled
population flow would cause the demise of the character and individuality
of the city. The loss of inner cohesion would leave it increasingly
without means to attract to itself the varied resources upon which the
culture of cities has always depended.
Economic Planning
Economic planning was another facet of the RFAA ' s plan for regional
reconstruction, under the guidance of Stuart Chase. His book, The Tragedy
of Waste
,
pointed out that World War I had its by products of technical
achievement, including the elimination of industrial waste through the
coordinated control of the economic structure. With one-fourth of the
work force involved in the war effort, Chase noted that "the standard of
23
living held its own and probably increased somewhat." Also, without
luxury items being produced, the lower class position improved relative
to the higher income groups. This was all made possible by the fact
that the War Industries Board, the Food, Fuel, and Railroad Administra-
tions, the U.S. Housing Corporation, and other federal agencies allocated
materials and distributed goods in an effort to eliminate waste.
Chase maintained that the war control turned the sluggish profit
oriented economic system into an efficient system of delivering goods and
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services. In fact, it was through this World War I phenomenon that Stuart
Chase became aware of the benefits of economic planning. Even though the
system of industrial control ended with the war and Chase was fired by
President Harding for being critical of big business, the RPAA, as con-
servationists, still held the conviction that resources were being wasted
and sought a method of reinstating an idea similar to the wartime controls.
Chase had studied the Soviet Union's Gosplan as part of the first
American trade union delegation to visit Russia, and was very impressed
with their economic methods. He believed that planning regions as economic
units would lower resource consumption, and that prices would decrease,
improving the standard of living for everyone. Economic planning could
also be used for building active and balanced regions, with factories
being directed to locations where they were needed rather than the laissez-
faire system of industrial location. The United States Shipping Board
had demonstrated that housing also could be placed in the same manner,
that is, according to need.
Rural Electrification
Rural electrification, another element in the regional reconstruc-
tion plan, was believed necessary in order to decrease the industrial
dominance of the urban centers with their corner on electricity. A balance
between country and city to overcome the rural population's increasing
isolation, was envisioned by the RPAA through long distance power trans-
mission. With these lines, not only could rural electrification be
hooked in, allowing small towns to support industry, but farm life could
be simplified by the added technological convenience.
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Community Planning
The RPAA's "community planning" consisted of a unified approach
to three variables which strongly influenced the form and growth of
cities: residential site planning practices, housing costs, and the
regional distribution of population, resources, and institutions. In
the practice of residential planning, the group stressed the economic
and social advantages of large scale development, but this type of develop-
ment required great concentrations of capital in contrast to individual
speculative builders working on smaller projects. Therefore, the RPAA
sought to acquire through the government an ample supply of low cost
capital for home building. Also, they theorized that if limited dividends
or cooperative housing companies could be supplied with sufficient capital,
the low and even middle income housing market might be withdrawn from the
speculative sphere completely. Finally, the RPAA urged a regional re-
construction which encompassed the establishment of new towns, the
renewal of existing cities (made economically feasible through decentrali-
zation), and preservation of the countryside.
The regional city proposed by the RPAA was not to be some ideal
form, but rather a new approach to city building in the regional context.
The term inferred a regional grouping of community types of all kinds,
large and small, based upon a planned regional balance of population,
resources, and institutions. In the regional city pattern, size would
be a function of explicit social objectives.
Through the enlargement of the development unit, the RPAA main-
tained that the planner or architect could exploit existing advantages
of site and topography, benefit from the economies of scale, including
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street and utility expenditures, efficiently group open space, and pro-
vide in advance for the necessary social and recreational facilities.
The members believed that these amenities, incorporated into the residen-
tial design, were important to the changing ratio between work and leisure
time in the 20th Century. They hoped that urban growth along cellular
lines would stimulate civic association, and that spatially defined,
visually attractive residential environments might counteract some of the
centrifugal pressures of urban life, thus reducing the huge complex of
the city to the more satisfying and manageable scale of the neighborhood.
These efforts to coordinate physical and social aspects of planning were
central to the RPAA's program.
The RPAA and The New Deal
The New Deal's enticement of political legitimacy drew members of
the RPAA into the governmental ranks, but they eventually realized that
in the process of instituting its new wave of reform, the New Deal had
only taken fragments of the RPAA's carefully detailed plan for regionalism.
The TVA, which the members hailed as the embodiment of their greatest
hopes, drawing Benton MacKaye and Tracy Augur to work for it, with Stuart
Chase the self-appointed publicist for the program, fell short of its
ultimate goal. Weaknesses in the TVA's design limited its authority as
a regional planning agency, as the powers delegated to it were for the
most part specific in nature, related to flood control, fertilizer, and
power.
The Rural Electrification Administration, as another example,
seemed to be undertaking the RPAA's plan to bring public power to the
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countryside. But without the additional efforts to industrially stabilize
the rural population as planned by the RPAA, rural electrification would
inevitably increase agricultural productivity and encourage further migra-
tion to the already overcrowded cities.
Although Catherine Bauer and Edith Elmer Wood both worked for the
New Deal administration, their housing ideals were not implemented as
outlined in their RPAA proposals. The Roosevelt administration instituted
a constructive housing program, but it was not couched in a regional
framework, proposed as essential to the policy by the RPAA. The New Deal's
public housing was primarily for reemployment of construction workers and
to stimulate allied industries, and only secondarily as a supply of new
housing for people who could not otherwise affort it.
The members of the RPAA who worked for the New Deal government
were competent technicians focused on piecemeal reforms, which tended to
restore stability to the metropolitan order they had set out to change.
They later regretted losing sight of their regional reconstruction goals,
and in 1948 Clarence Stein tried to revive the group as the Regional
Development Council of America, but the spirit could not be recaptured
24
and within a few years it dissolved.
Because regionalism as defined by the RPAA was a policy framework,
housing, power development, highway building, are segments which reinforce
that policy. In contrast, the New Deal administered such programs as
separate entities, trying to use them to shore up the economy. The RPAA
membership felt that their sort of regionalism demanded a commitment which
coordinated all of the factors necessary to social change. The remaining
organization members disapproved of the fact that other members, instead
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of maintaining their integrated program, promoted specific reforms in-
dependent of the regional vision. Lewis Mumford felt this was because
President Roosevelt was a true opportunist who used the talents of people
caught up in the heady rush of New Deal rhetoric and power, to his own
ends, which were likely to change rather quickly.
Conclusion
The decentralization which the RPAA had in mind was not based upon
the notion of the removal of single factories to suburbs or open country,
nor the moving of a group of factories or an industry from one place to
another to benefit from cheaper labor, nor the reduction in size of large
cities only to achieve low density suburban diffusion. The RPAA's region-
alism implied centralization as much as its opposite, in that it sought
to utilize the region as a planning unit involved in a unified program
to build up old centers, break up congested centers, and found new centers.
The members wanted the regional city to establish a symbiotic, rather
than a parasitic relationship with the surrounding countryside. They
set no city size, and no particular type of city as a criteria, feeling
that the amount of concentration need would differ according to the geo-
graphic influences and the type of work involved. The range included the
village to serve the agricultural community and the regional capital,
acting as the center for regional administration, business, and higher
education, as well as other specialized functions to service the area.
Mumford assumed that minimum and maximum population groupings were a
result of a function of regional agricultural and industrial development
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along with a rich and diverse community life, rather than an "ideal" or
arbitrary size decision.
In Mumford's opinion, neither the metropolis nor the suburb served
the long range economic or the social needs of the regional population.
Suburban diffusion destroyed the landscape and produced partial com-
munities, lacking form or a sound economic and cultural base. In the
metropolis, excessive money went into expensive transportation systems
and other utilities, thus increasing congestion by raising the value and
forcing a more intensive use of the land. Congestion and high real
estate prices in turn discouraged setting aside land for public and com-
munity purposes and made it increasingly difficult to house the popula-
tion adequately. Therefore, the RPAA proposed community building within
the regional framework, as a better option than metropolitan centraliza-
25
tion or low density suburban fragments and satellites.
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CHAPTER II
THE NEW DEAL
When the future is laid out in clear and objective—even if ten-
tative—terms, the result is equally unacceptable to politician
and businessman. Neither can survive exactitude. Yet it is in
this clear understanding that the public interest has its best
chance to prevail
.
— P.J.D. Wiles*
The RPAA, while not seeing their total program implemented, did
influence the times to come, particularly the New Deal era, with its
resultant emphasis on national planning. Regionalism appealed to
Franklin Roosevelt (Eleanor Roosevelt, a greenbelt supporter, had served
on the CHC board), and to his advisor, Rexford G. Tugwell . Without the
RPAA's ten year advocacy of a publicly developed program of garden cities
within regions, the Greenbelt Town Program would probably never have been
thought of. The President had addressed the RPAA's Round Table on
Regionalism in 1931, and two years later the RPAA wrote to him, urging
him to locate and design new communities in connection with industrial
decentralization. But as finally implemented, the program focused on re-
locating displaced country dwellers, reflecting Roosevelt's limited com-
prehension of the idea, in spite of the efforts of members who were em-
ployed in the New Deal administration to influence the program. Thus,
the Greenbelt program lacked the decentralizing ingredient critical to
the RPAA's design for regional reconstruction.
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Rexford Tugwel
1
Rexford G. Tugwell was born in 1891 in Sinclairville in western
New York state. The family moved to Wilson, New York in 1904, where he
worked each summer in his father's canning plant during his college years.
Through this job, he made the acquaintance of the impoverished Sicilians
who were seasonal workers in the factory, and came to question the fair-
ness of a system in which workers were given the lowest possible wages,
and the morality of profit-seeking and unrestrained competition.
Tugwel 1 received a Ph.D. from the Wharton School of Finance in
1922. Ke became an instructor in economics at Columbia University in
1920, and remained at Columbia until 1937. That he was impatient with
orthodox economics, was evident from his earliest writings, beginning with
his Ph.D. thesis, "The Economic Basis of Public Interest," published in
1922. Tugwell wrote articles to the same effect in academic quarterlies
and in the New Republic
,
to which he was a contributing editor, and wrote
and edited several books which criticized the existing laissez-faire
economy and that called for economic planning and for the governmental
regulation of industry to serve social, rather than individual, ends.
Tugwell mingled freely with the Socialists and the League for In-
dustrial Democracy and the Civil Liberties Union, and in the summer of
1927 took advantage of an opportunity to spend two months in the Soviet
Union with a delegation of trade unionists including Stuart Chase. He
returned impressed, and co-edited with Chase and contributed a chapter
on Russian agriculture to the book Soviet Russia in the Second Decade
(Day, 1928).
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His approach to economic problems, anticipated some features of
the New Deal, and when Roosevelt was campaigning for the 1932 Democratic
presidential nomination, Raymond Moley, who had known Tugwell at Columbia,
suggested him as a valuable counselor. Tugwell joined Moley and A. A.
Berle as one of Roosevelt's close pre-election advisors, particularly on
agricultural problems; later he urged Moley to recommend Henry Wallace
as Secretary of Agriculture. In 1933, he was asked by Wallace to be
Assistant Secretary, joining the New Deal in an official capacity.
One of Roosevelt's "brain trusters," Tugwell became a leading
spokesman for New Deal programs, and he advanced many original ideas for
economic, social, and agricultural reform. In a newspaper interview in
January 1933 he advocated the spending of $5 billion for relief and re-
distribution of purchasing power, the rapid spending of public works
money, and higher income and inheritance taxes, and he urged that consumer
protection be part of the National Recovery Act. He opposed internation-
alism as a foreign policy but urged international agreements to control
production—he was defeated on all scores.
In 1934, he was a member of the Housing Board, the Surplus Relief
Administration, the Commercial Policy Committee, and the Public Works
Board. From 1935 through 1935 he was administrator of the Rural Resettle-
ment Administration, which relocated farmers from unproductive to fertile
land and provided advice on scientific methods of farming. His green
belt "Tugwell -towns" have served as models for private and government
low-income suburban housing projects.
In addition to being strongly influenced by economic "Institution-
alists" such as Simon Patten and Thorstein Veblen, "Proqressivism," with
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its optimism, environmental ism, moral fervor, and emphasis on leadership
by a benevolent intellectual elite within the framework of a democratic
society, was another important source of Tugwell's thinking in political
economy.
Tugwell's ideas concerning society's accommodation of technology
included four general assumptions: (1) concentration and control, (2)
a managed economy, (3) price controls, and (4) consumer interests.
In the phrase, "concentration and control," which Charles R. Van
Hise of the University of Wisconsin used before World War I, "Concentra-
tion" denoted unhampered development of huge productive units for tech-
nological efficiency. "Control" meant guarantees that the new industrial
structure would benefit society as a whole. In a modern industrial system
there would always be coordinators who would hold the keys to power. The
choice, Tugwell said, was between a "supertrust outside our political
forms (which may swamp the state in the backwash of its progress) and an
2
assimilation to the state of the going system". Either the government
would supervise the planners, or the planners would supervise the govern-
ment. He speculated that an all-embracing system could bring pressure
to bear on coordinators who tried to take advantage of other businessmen
and people at large.
Tugwell felt that American political and economic tradition, which
was rooted in rural values, individualism and independence, in free enter-
prise, and the political philosophy o- Jefferson, needed to be replaced
by collectivistic ideas, by urban values, fitted to proletarian aspira-
tions rather than those of large or small property holders. In addition,
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he wanted some of the puritanism and provincialism of Americans replaced
by a degree of European sophistication.
While Tugwell disapproved strongly of businessmen who abused the
public interest, he did not blame them personally, because it was un-
realistic to expect "conformity to a design which does not exist, nor to
4
a sequential program which is not laid out. He believed that the
elimination of unethical business practices lay not in the transformation
of human nature but in institutional reforms.
In The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts (1933),
Tugwell outlined his ideas on the management of the economy. Intra-
industry associations would create planning boards for each industry.
The effectiveness of these boards would rest on the voluntary coopera-
tion of the businesses within an industry. Employers, employees, and
consumers would work out plans for production, prices, division of markets,
and working conditions. When matters became interindustrial in scope,
they would pass over to the jurisdiction of a central planning board.
This central board would represent the various industries and the govern-
ment. It would be a "mediating and integrating body," coordinating intra-
industrial plans into a national planning program. It would also be a
research organization, gathering the data needed for such a program. The
central board would retain two crucial functions for itself: final super-
vision of capital investment and control of prices.
Price controls, in Tugwell 's view, were essential to the mainten-
ance of balance between production and consumption. Price policies which
failed to pass on technological gains to consumers eventually resulted
in a recession. Price controls fitted precisely into "concentration and
control." Tugwell held that in order to attempt positive control of
5
prices invalidation of the ideology of antitrust laws was a necessity.
Price controls would afford basic protection for consumers, and Tugwell
also wanted specific representation in a national planning program of
the consumer interest, as well as a balanced relationship between indus-
try and agriculture for economic stabilization.
Tugwell 's general guidelines for the coordinating scheme specified
that intraindustry boards would work from the bottom up, and a central
planning board would oversee interindustry affairs from the top down.
Opponents said that his scheme could not work in a democracy,
and they charged that it was socialistic, Marxist, Sovietist, total-
itarian. Businessmen were his greatest opponents, as they feared the
future laid out in clear, objective, terms, because they thrived on un-
certainty and were gamblers, interested in keeping society insecure to
create gambler's risk conditions. Politicians opposed a planned future
which might interfere with their campaign promises and exploitation of
the popular impulse toward an uncomplicated past. Tugwell considered
the issue between private and public ownership unimportant to the planned
economy. Most important to him was the achieving of publicly oriented
direction, whether of publicly or privately owned agencies. Planning,
far from being socialistic, would save capitalism.
To demonstrate peoples' reactions to Tugwell and his political
beliefs either real or presumed, consider the case of the corporation
executive of Wilmington, Delaware, who did not have to read Tugwell 's
words— he could identify a subversive just by looking at him. Tugwell
was rooming in Washington with Jerome Frank, the successful young
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corporation lawyer who had been named General Counsel of the A. A. A. The
executive, an acquaintance of Frank's, returned to Wilmington after a
visit to Washington and sent a telegram to Frank: BEWARE COMMA JEROME
BEWARE STOP THIS MORNING AT YOUR BREAKFAST TABLE I SAW THE FACE OF ROBES-
PIERRE STOP THAT MAN WOULD WILLINGLY GO TO THE GUILLOTINE FOR AN IDEAL
AND TAKE HIS FRIENDS WITH HIM STOP BEWARE. One evening as they were
driving home, Frank read the telegram aloud. Tugwell, usually a careful
driver, swung a corner and grazed a curb. He said it was a hell of a life
when idiots came in to look at you and then just said what they read in
the papers.
o
"In any event," Frank replied, "you drive like Robespierre."
The Planning Agency as the Fourth Power
"The Fourth Power" written in 1939 denoted Tugwell 's recommenda-
tion of the establishment of a planning agency outside the three tradi-
tional branches of government. He believed that officials of the existing
political system, with their short-run and political interests, could not
effectively discharge the responsibility of planning {exercise the "direc-
tive power") in the public interest. He concluded that the ability to
get ahead in politics and the ability to rise to statesmanship in public
service seldom went together. The "Fourth Power" would be exercised
by experts meeting highly selective qualifications. Their terms of
appointment would be relatively long— longer than any others in government
except the judiciary. The planning body would function under a fixed pro-
cedure of expert preparation, public hearings, agreed findings, and care-
ful translation into law—subject to legislative ratification. The
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public would contribute ideas at the beginning of the process and a final
say at the end. The experts would not determine social aims, but would
devise ways of managing the economy to achieve the general aims which the
public indicated it wanted to realize.
Tugwell believed that the federal government could create this kind
of planning body without taking power away from the states, or exercising
further control over private business. He preferred business self-
government to direct governmental planning. Democratic voluntarism,
through a coordinating setup, could make it unnecessary for a planning
agency to exercise its reserved powers to control capital investment and
prices. He believed that planning, being based on substantial agreement,
would be more democratic than most governmental processes; it would reg-
ularize and make effective what is otherwise done, but not done as well
as needed by society.
Roosevelt was painfully aware that there was no machinery through
which he could gather reliable economic data, make forecasts, establish
goals, issue orders, and analyze results. He made efforts to adapt or
invent some central agency suitable for overall management, with little
success. The liberal mentality was deeply divided on the matter of state
intervention. All liberals advocated a vigorous intervening government,
but those whose education had been in the Wilson-Brandeis tradition were
hostile to interventions which appeared to foster a permanent administra-
tive bureaucracy.
Reformers who were emotionally ready for national planning remained
a minority, and FDR himself reflected the conflicts in the liberal mind,
although he appeared to lean toward Tugwell rather than toward Brandeis.
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Tugwell liked to describe those who, like himself, worked for a
collectivist social management as "the middlemen of modernity." He knew
they had been defeated as early as 1934, when he had a conversation about
planning with FDR as the NRA headed towards its demise. Roosevelt made
it clear that he was through with central planning, that the government
would either accept regulatory roles piecemeal, as the situation might
dictate, or fall back upon New Freedom progressivism and work for an end
to monopoly. Tugwell realized that the effort at coordinated planning
had failed, and the collectivists would not soon get another chance:
I was asking for too much. It was not only NRA, it was the whole
organic conception of a living nation, equipped with institutions
for foresight, conjecture, and balance. It was not yet time for
it.... 12
Tugwell 's work on reorganization of the government and his special
assignments both related, at least in part, to conservation, which was
at the heart of his concern for agriculture and rural America. In 1933,
the desire to realize the aspirations he had harbored for years as "an
earnest, if relatively amateur, conservationist" had been a decisive
factor in his decision to go to Washington.- Now, as a public official,
Tugwell made his views on conservation known to a wider audience in the
14
years 1933-1936 in many articles and speeches.
New Deal Relocation Programs
In the summer of 1932 Rexford Tugwell met with Mil burn L. Wilson,
a farm economist from Montana, to begin mapping a possible program of
national agricultural planning. Tugwell was already trying to steer
Roosevelt closer to full commitment to national economic planning. The
52
advocacy of major planning policies by Wilson and Tugwell represented the
fruition of ideas and policies advocated earlier by Ely, Patten, and a
few other economic rebels. When this occurred in the New Deal, Tugwell
and Wilson, in addition to their policy making influence in agricultural
planning, were about to shape and direct the community program in its most
formative years.
The National Land Use Planning Committee was made up of agricul-
tural leaders from the Department of Agriculture, the Federal Farm Board,
the Federal Farmers Loan Board, the land grant colleges, and the Depart-
ment of the Interior. The committee studied land uses in the Tennessee
Valley, investigated the possibilities of industrial decentralization,
and offered some guidance to the back-to-the-land movement of the depres-
sion. In the New Deal it was merged, along with Ickes' National Planning
Board in the Public Works Administration, into the National Resources
Committee, which was the first truly national planning agency. M. L.
Wilson was to become Director of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads.
A large program of land retirement was set up under the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Administration, but with funds from the Federal Emer-
gency Relief Administration. These programs were moved to the Resettle-
ment Administration in 1935, where the land planners not only purchased
submarginal land but provided a planning staff for the location of reset-
tlement communities. In the Resettlement Administration, city planners
joined the land planners.
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Subsistence Homesteads Program
Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted to extend public planning to the
country and create 'wholly new rural communities' with facilities for new
industries. With a rural rather than an urban emphasis, Roosevelt, like
Ebenezer Howard, wanted to wed the city to the country. He wondered "if
out of this regional planning we are not going to be in a position to take
the bull by the horns in the immediate future and adopt some kind of
experimental work based on distribution of population."
In January, 1933, Roosevelt asked Henry Wallace, Tugwell and Wilson
to draw plans for the reorganization of the Department of Agriculture
into an instrument of national planning. In his inauguration speech,
Roosevelt asked that America "recognize the overbalance of population in
our industrial centers and, by engaging on a national scale in a redis-
tribution, endeavor to provide a better use of the land for those best
fitted for the land. 16
Land use planning, would certainly displace many farm families,
and with mass unemployment in the cities, industry offered no refuge.
The only possible answer in Wilson's opinion was industrial decentraliza-
tion and small subsistence homesteads of a few acres. On this small
acreage a family could grow all its food and thus be able to accept
shorter hours in industry. Situated between commercial agriculture and
full time industrial employment, it was hoped that subsistence homesteads
communities would bring about a new balance between agriculture and
industry, absorbing both the industrially unemployed and the displaced
farmers.
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Tugwell visualized the difficulty of change or adjustment and pre-
dicted that any planning by the state would necessitate involuntary reg-
imentation and class conflict.
17
He felt that the doctrine of individu-
alism in the United States had prevented the expert supervision of farmers
by those who knew how to improve a backward agriculture. As to community
planning, he wanted garden cities for industrial workers, but he was never
enthusiastic about Roosevelt and Wilson's ideas on communities of part-
time farming and industry. Tugwell later described Roosevelt's strong
support of subsistence homesteads as a bit of impractical agrarian senti-
mentality, a "Utopian notion out of the past— the idea that men are better
1
8
off close to nature and working with their hands on their own acres.
The Subsistence Homesteads Bill
Originally, the Subsistence Homesteads bill was introduced to
Congress twice by Senator John H. Bankhead, with the details explicitly
given for the qualifications of those selected and the financial arrange-
ments for their ultimate purchase of the land they settled. However,
since neither of the subsistence homesteads bills was acted upon by Con-
gress, Senator Bankhead, with White House backing, was able to add an
abbreviated form to the National Industrial Recovery Act in May, 1933.
Almost hidden as Section 208 of Title II, it read:
To provide for aiding in the redistribution of the overbalance of
population in industrial centers $25,000,000 is hereby made avail-
able to the President, to be used by him through such agencies as
he may establish and under such regulations as he may make, for
making loans for and otherwise aiding in the purchase of subsistence
homesteads. The moneys collected as repayment of said loans shall
consititute a revolving fund to be administered as directed by the
President for the purposes of this section. 19
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This abbreviated, generalized section hardly represented the more
detailed ideas of its supporters--it did not specifically provide for
any program of colonization or for planned communities, as its funds
were not limited to that use. Turning over the planning of the program
to the President was typical of the emergency legislation of 1933, and
subjected each idea concerning subsistence homesteads to conflicting in-
terpretations of implementation.
President Roosevelt designated Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the
Interior, to carry out the provisions of Section 208. Since this section
contained almost no guide as to how the $25,000,000 for subsistence home-
steads should be spent, Ickes could have placed the program in his Public
Works Administration, which was headed by Robert D. Kohn. With his ex-
perience in city planning and public housing in World War I and in the
Regional Planning Association of America, Kohn wanted to use the funds to
establish a few farm colonies and several garden cities of the Radburn
type.
Ickes decided instead to place subsistence homesteads in a separate
program, and sought advice from practically everyone interested in garden
cities, farm colonies, or the back-to-the-land movement. As director of
the program, Ickes selected M. L. Wilson, who brought with him not only
a well formulated plan for subsistence homesteads but a conscious, defined
social philosophy as well. While Wilson defined a "better life" as in-
cluding some contact with the soil and countryside, he was aware of the
freeing potentialities of technological improvements.
In outlining to Ickes his thoughts on how best to use the limited
appropriation for subsistence homesteads, Wilson advised widely distributed
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experimental communities as object lessons in the decentralization of
industry and in the creation of a new pattern of life. He recommended
a federal plan of administration with decentralized administration and
responsibility. The communities, which were to be located near available
employment, were to include four types: experimental farm colonies, sub-
sistence gardens for city workers, colonies for stranded workers, and
primarily, homesteads for part time industrial workers. A constant
problem was the farmers' fear of government sponsored competition. On
the other side were some of the industrialists who would have liked to
use subsistence homesteads to assure, at no expense to themselves, an
ample, complacent labor force. In formulating policies, Wilson had the
advice of a group of distinguished people who, sharing a common interest
in subsistence homesteads, had voluntarily organized a National Advisory
Committee on Subsistence Homesteads, with Rexford G. Tugwell , then Under-
secretary of Agriculture, as one of its participating members.
The committee decided that the division would concentrate on three
types of colonies: communities of part time farmers near industrial em-
ployment, all rural colonies for resettled submarginal farmers, and a few
villages with newly decentralized industry. The last were to be the most
experimental and the most controversial communities.
The division published its first information circular in 1933, ex-
palining the purposes and policies of the subsistence homesteads program.
A typical community was described as containing from 25 to 200 families
living on individual homesteads of from one to five acres, containing an
orchard, a vegetable garden, poultry, a pig, and, in some cases, a cow.
Eventual ownership was promised for most colonists. The community sites
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were to be approved by agricultural experts, and the homestead develop-
ment had to be in accordance with approved planning, architectural, and
engineering practices. Houses were to be moderate in cost, but conforming
with standards of durability, attractiveness, and sanitation, with essen-
tial utilities provided. The homesteaders, selected from low income
groups, were to be chosen only after an inquiry into character traits,
agricultural fitness, employment prospects, and other factors. In all
cases the federal funds were to be lent and not granted, with repayment
over a period of thirty years at 4 percent interest, and the funds were
to be lent by a Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation to local cor-
20
porations at the community level.
The local corporation appeared to be an excellent device for
carrying out the local work of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads.
It could borrow the money, construct the communities, and issue purchase
contracts to homesteaders. Local sponsors and prominent citizens would
be on its board of directors, insuring local interest and support. Later,
when the communities were completed, the corporation could collect pay-
ments from the homesteaders and manage the community. As the homesteaders
gained equity in their homes, they would be given the stock of the corpora-
tion, making them joint owners of their own community. With its abilities
to use ordinary business procedures, it could purchase land and contract
for construction with much greater speed than the government could.
One of the most influential agrarians or distributists while not
a member of the RPAA, was Ralph Borsodi, who in 1920 personally started
subsistence farming on a small homestead near New York City. By utilizing
labor-saving tools and by growing and processing a phenomenal number of
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foods, Borsodi achieved economic independence and became the supreme
exemplar of self-sufficient successful back-to-the-land. Borsodi, who
also favored the single tax, aesthetically revolted against the ugliness
of the city and proposed subsistence homesteads as an escape. In the
depression Borsodi found several to follow him back to the land, and when
the Division of Subsistence Homesteads was established, Borsodi was
already guiding the development of a homestead colony in Dayton, Ohio.
The first subsistence homesteads loan went to this project in October,
1933.
The ideas behind these plans combined the need for relief with
Borsodi 's escapist agrariansim and an emphasis on self-help. Homesteaders
were to build their own homes, grow subsistence crops on a small acreage,
carry on group activities, and have a common pasture and wood lot, while
receiving wages for part time employment in Dayton. Weaving, sewing, and
other family crafts were to be developed. Homesteads were to be leased to
clients in a modified single-tax system. 23 A small loan of $50,000 for
the first of the planned communities was all Borsodi ever received from
the Division of Subsistence Homesteads. His Dayton project was the only
one in which the government never owned the land. From the beginning
Borsodi resisted any federal control over his project, desiring financial
aid without governmental control.
The second project was the most controversial and the most publi-
cized of all the subsistence homesteads. It was a projected community of
200 family units for stranded coal miners at Reedsville, West Virginia.
Coming directly from the work of Clarence Pickett and the humanitarian in-
terest of Eleanor Roosevelt, this project, which was soon to be named
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Arthurdale after the name of a former owner of the estate, was the first
to be developed and was the site of much open experimentation and count-
less mistakes. In December 1933 and January 1934, three other stranded
workers' communities were announced by the division—these were Cumberland
Homesteads near Crossville, Tennessee, Tygard Valley Homesteads, near
Elkins, West Virginia, and Westmoreland Homesteads, near Greensburg,
Pennsylvania. They were designed for unemployed miners who had been
stranded since the closing of coal mines as far back as 1920.
The four stranded communities were a source of constant embarrass-
ment to the Division and its successor agencies, as they were the only
subsistence homesteads to be settled by destitute relief clients who had
no opportunity for employment. Since they were planned only for part time
farming, with very small plots of ground, some type of industrial employ-
ment was essential--either industry had to move voluntarily to these com-
munities or the Division had to find some method of providing economic
security, or the homesteaders would remain stranded government dependents.
Hosiery mills became a source of employment for some of the residents.
Perhaps the most interesting community developed by the Division
of Subsistence Homesteads was Jersey Homesteads near Hightstown, New
Jersey. Two hundred Jewish garment workers in New York City banded to-
gether to establish the colony, and supplementing the funds authorized
by the Division with individual contributions of S500 each, they planned
a cooperative garment factory, a cooperative farm, and consumer coopera-
tives. In many ways Jersey Homesteads (later called Roosevelt) was to
be more of a garden or satellite city than a part time farming, part time
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industrial community. Because of long delays in its planning, its con-
struction was entirely carried out by the Resettlement Administration.
Austin Homesteads at Austin, Minnesota, was unique in being located
near a one-factory town and in being sponsored by the president of that
one factory, George A. Hormel of the Hormel Packing Company. Seventy
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percent of the homesteaders at Austin were to be Hormel employees.
The fact that M. L. Wilson accepted the plans of Hormel and many other
industrialists on other sponsoring committees, reflected his belief in
the good intentions of industrial leaders and in the necessity of coopera-
tion from industry in setting up part time farming, part time industrial
communities.
Before June, 1934, which marked the end of Wilson's work in the
Division of Subsistence Homesteads and an important change in policies,
approximately thirty-one industrial type subsistence homesteads were
announced, although of these only twenty-three were ever completed. As
a whole, these were more successful and less controversial than the
stranded-workers or the rural type, although much less publicized. From
a financial standpoint, several of these were to prove the most successful
of any of the communities constructed by the New Deal. They conformed
more closely to the original intentions of the subsistence homesteads
legislation and the administrators of the program. In one sense they were
the only true subsistence homesteads, combining access to part time indus-
trial employment with a partial subsistence from the land. All of them
were located within commuting distance of some type of industrial employ-
ment, in either a small or large city, and were almost always sponsored
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by a local corporation. There were variations beyond these similarities,
but in most ways they conformed to the official definition of a subsis-
25
tence homestead.
Comptroller General McCarl , by requiring the same accounting pro-
cedure from the local corporations as from government agencies, nullified
one of the primary purposes of the corporate device. He also made it
almost impossible to use the local corporations in other than an advisory
capacity. This threatened the whole policy of decentralized administra-
tion which was at the foundation of the entire Subsistence Homesteads
program.
This was only the beginning of a series of decisions rendered by
McCarl which restricted the work of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads.
An angry Ickes described McCarl as "not only a Republican but a reactionary
„26
RepuDl ican.
The question of local versus federal control led to the first
major policy and administrative change in the subsistence homesteads pro-
gram. Ickes, despite his resentment over McCarl 's interferences, had long
disliked the decentralized administration of the Division of Subsistence
Homesteads. He began to dismantle the decentralized administrative struc-
ture by first forbidding any appointment at the local level, requiring
all applications to be cleared through him, and finally abolishing all
control by the local corporations, completely federalizing the subsistence
homesteads program.
The federalization order not only dashed the hopes of many local
groups, the sudden shift in policy seriously prejudiced the popularity
of subsistence homesteads. Borsodi , at Dayton, fought back, refusing to
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have his project federalized and brought suit against the Federal Sub-
sistence Homesteads Corporation for breach of contract. The Division
decided to honor the loan contract with Borsodi's group, allowing the
27project to continue under local direction. The federalization order
required a complete organizational change in the division. Although
project plans submitted by local groups were still considered, a Planning
Section was established to take the lead in initiating new projects. In
addition, a Construction Section was organized to direct the projects'
physical development, an Operation Section, which controlled the admin-
istrative problems of each local project, directed the project managers,
and a Community Development Section was established to direct the new
communities. As projects were occupied, the project managers were re-
placed by community managers, assisted by farm, home, health, and educa-
tional advisers.
Land tenure presented a real problem to the Division of Subsistence
Homesteads. Since the single tax ideas of Henry George, most community
planners had desired some limitation on fee simple or unrestricted land
ownership. But most Americans had continued to accept fee simple owner-
ship as an essential part of the American way of life and were either un-
aware of, or unconcerned about, such problems as speculation, high land
prices, and uncontrolled exploitation of land resources. Even the limited
restrictions imposed by zoning laws were viewed with alarm and apprehension
by many. Thus the agricultural economists and social planners were usually
at odds with the broader public on this important question. Because of
the experimental and derionstrational nature of the subsistence homesteads
communities, most officials of the division felt that, despite the expressed
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desire of most homesteaders for free title to their individual pieces of
land, something less than fee simple ownership would be in order to assure
the success of the project while protecting the interests of the home-
steader. They feared that free titles would lead to speculation in both
land and homes, yet the homesteaders wanted the security and independence
that they believed could come only with complete ownership.
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads solved this dilemma by a
compromise. It announced that, in all but the stranded communities the
homesteader would be permitted to purchase his own home within a thirty
year period at three percent interest, without any down payment. But the
homesteader could not receive title to his land until he had paid three-
fourths of the purchase price and, in no case, not until after five years.
This meant government control for from five to twenty-two years, yet
partially appeased the proponents of fee simple. Actually, since no
communities were completed when the Resettlement Administration absorbed
the subsistence homesteads in May 1935, all homesteaders were under
temporary licensing agreement.
The End of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads
In February 1935, the Comptroller General challenged the legality
of nearly all the expenditures, made one year earlier, of the local cor-
porations, ruling that there had been no authorization for the formation
of local corporations, no authority for advancing funds to them, no
authority for land purchased under Section 206, and no compliance with
government procedures by the local corporations. This made new legisla-
tion imperative, but a more detailed subsistence homesteads bill, introduced
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in the House, died in committee. Then McCarl ruled that the division,
not having been extended by new legislation and as a temporary part of
the National industrial Recovery Act, would automatically go out of
existence on June 16, 1935. This meant so many uncompleted communities
and unfulfilled obligations that some new authorization was imperative.
In May, two months before the expiration date, Roosevelt transferred all
the property and assets of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads to the
newly created Resettlement Administration.
The back-to-the-land and subsistence homesteads program had been
born in the depths of the depression, and had been motivated largely by
the despair of the depression. But by 1935 the sense of despair and
urgency was disappearing. The emotional appeal of a homestead, of gardens
and handicrafts, was beginning to fade, along with the honeymoon period
of the New Deal, when desperation and a sense of impending disaster
unified almost all groups and classes in a national effort toward recovery.
The Resettlement Administration
In the first 18 months of the Resettlement Administration, the
community building program of the New Deal reached its climax. A large
administrative organization was developed and an ambitious program was
launched--however, planned communities became more controversial and more
unpopular than ever before. In the opinions of most people, "Resettlement
Administration" was almost synonymous with the name of its first admin-
istrator, Rexford G. Tugwell. Already one of the most controversial major
figures of the New Deal, Tugwell insured that the R.A. program would be
an object of attack and abuse. Most of Tugwell 's unpopularity sprang from
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his inability or unwillingness to conceal revolutionary ideas in tradi-
tional terminology. He wanted collectivism and called it by that name.
He felt that the depression might be justified if it helped to break the
pattern of dogmatized institutions and ideas. He held that the institu-
tion of capitalism, permitted the exploitation of both human and physical
resources.
Tugwell desired an organic society, with a unity of purpose, a
cooperative and collective economy, and a purposeful, functioning govern-
ment. This would require a willingness on the part of the people to
make some sacrifices, for a collective society would mean a publicly con-
trolled economy, whether through nationalization or strict regulation of
industry. It would mean a larger degree of regimentation, a necessity
for discipline, an end to individualism as an economic concept, and the
end of speculation. But it also could mean no glaring contrasts in income
and well-being, a more balanced allotment of individual liberty, less
exploitation of human resources. At the heart of a tremendously enlarged
government with a strong executive having a large amount of delegated
power, would be the social scientists, the experts, the planners, who
would determine the future needs and possibilities of society and would
OQ
lay out the progress routes.
But Tugwell 's hopes were thwarted, as the vast majority of the
citizenry continued to cling to individualism and independence, refusing
even to consider collectivism. The Resettlement Administration was a
repository for a multitude of New Deal programs. It was to carry on rural
relief or rehabilitation, continue the whole land-utilization program,
and continue and extend the New Deal community building program through
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both rural and urban resettlement. Loans to individuals, to cooperatives,
grants to destitute farmers, and the care of migratory workers were also
included.
To Tugwell the assignment of the Resettlement Administration was
twofold: rehabilitation and permanent reform, the latter he believed,
meant a rearrangement of America according to plan. His first task was
a staggering one—molding an integrated administrative organization that
could direct several distinct programs, and in addition, formulating vital
policies. The Resettlement Administration included the Division of Sub-
sistence Homesteads, three sections of the Federal Emergency Relief
Administration, the state rural rehabilitation corporations, the Land
Policy Section of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and small
sections of several other agencies. There was constant pressure for quick
results, for the R.A. was part of the emergency relief program and was
justified legislatively only as it provided immediate work relief for the
unemployed. These facts should partially excuse any early mistakes made
by the Resettlement Administration.
As in the F.E.R.A., Tugwell set up a completely decentralized
organization for most of the Resettlement Administration program, dividing
the country into eleven regions and placing most of the action programs
in the regional offices, while small offices were also set up in each
state and in most counties. This form cf organization was necessary for
the rehabilitation program, which involved loans and supervision in almost
every rural county in the country. The suburban resettlement program,
located in the environs of a few large cities, was controlled from
Washington and had no connection with the regional offices.
6?
The complex administrative organization of the Resettlement Admin-
istration was much criticized. Instead of four main divisions to perform
the four main tasks of the Resettlement Administration—rural relief,
land utilization, rural resettlement, and suburban resettlement--Tugwell
created twelve coordinate divisions. The Rural Resettlement, Suburban
Resettlement, Construction, and Management Divisions were most intimately
connected with the R.A. communities. The Construction Division did all
the construction for both rural and suburban divisions. Rural Resettle-
ment approved plans for and initiated all rural communities, as well as
continuing the planning of those uncompleted rural communities begun by
the Subsistence Homesteads Division and the F.E.R.A. Suburban Resettle-
ment, which has very little connection with the other divisions of the
R.A., had complete control of the greenbelt cities and the uncompleted
suburban subsistence homesteads. Management controlled completed com-
munities, directing educational and community activities, developing eco-
nomic opportunities, selecting settlers, organizing community governments,
and taking care of the maintenance of the buildings in the communities.
Aware of the problems already encountered by the subsistence home-
steads and rural industrial communities, the administrators of the R.A.
attempted to formulate a different program for its new communities. The
Suburban Resettlement Division set up a Technical Research Unit which
studied English housing and garden cities. The Land Use Planning Section
compiled an enormous report on resettlement policy and procedure, citing
the prior settlement efforts in the United States and abroad. The report
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reflected the cautious approach of the land economists and advised re-
settlement on individual or closely grouped farms rather than in organized
communities.
The land economists urged that cooperatives be encouraged, but
warned against compulsory or planned cooperation. They cautioned against
any attempt to combine new industries with farm colonies and asked for
an ultimate sale price based more on an appraised value and the client's
earning power than on the actual cost to the Resettlement Administration.
On the problem of land tenure, they wanted a permanent lease for the client
unqualified for land ownership, a temporary trial lease with an option of
future purchase for the average client and an extended, forty-year purchase
contract for the superior client. 2 ®
Also advising Tugwell on policy matters was a short lived Planning
Division, whose personnel represented a very nonrural background. It
advised against part time farming as a means of raising living standards
of low income workers, stressed the small economic importance of handi-
crafts and the greater possibilities of cooperative enterprises, and recom-
mended some plantation projects and completely cooperative farms as social
experiments. It advised decentralization in existing industrial areas by
town planning of the garden city type rather than by setting up more
Arthurdales and then praying for industry to follow. Most of all, the
Planning Division questioned the whole policy of loans as a means to re-
habilitation, asking instead for grants and a frank subsidy to an already
overburdened group.
Tugwell formulated an initial community program that incorporated
ideas from both the Land Planning Section and the Planning Division.
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Although he did not exclude a few more subsistence homesteads communities,
Tugwell's main emphasis was to be on all rural communities for farmers
and garden cities for full time industrial workers, neither depending
upon a mixed agricultural and industrial economy. Rural resettlement
projects would include both the infiltration of settlers into existing
communities and the creation of new communities. The probability of some
subsidy was accepted, but the policy of rehabilitation by loans was never
dropped, and could not have been, dje to public opinion. Cooperative
enterprises were to be a major objective of the Resettlement Administra-
tion. Tugwell, who -felt the need for some limitation on fee simple
ownership, stressed security as a better goal than ownership, realized
that some people needed continuous assistance and supervision, and asked
for a long time relationship between the government and the individual,
either by a long purchase contract or by a conditional lease. Tugwell's
greatest interest was garden cities or greenbelt cities.
By December, 1935, eighteen industrial homesteads, inherited from
the Subsistence Homesteads Division, were complete. These communities
gave the R.A. fewer problems than any other inherited communities, since
they were usually located near economic opportunities and usually had
good settlers. The R.A. completed these communities according to original
plans, but often added extra community facilities, such as community
buildings.
The Resettlement Administration soon learned the forgetful ness of
the public, for the four stranded subsistence homesteads communities,
Arthurdale, Westmoreland, Tygart Valley, and Cumberland, were identified
with Tugwell and became his mistakes, even though Tugwell constantly
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reiterated that they were established "on a theory in which none of u's
believed." 30 He had always felt that it was fallacious to assume that
industry, particularly in a time of depression, would decentralize volun-
tarily, particularly to isolated mountain communities. But since the
Resettlement Administration had inherited the stranded communities,
Tugwell decided to make the best of a sorry fate.
The economic situation on the four projects was not encouraging,
and three methods were developed by the R.A. to relieve it. In some cases
additional land was purchased and added to the cooperative farms. In
all cases the construction of homes was not rushed to completion, allowing
the homesteaders a longer period of employment. But primarily the Re-
settlement Administration relied on cooperative enterprises to benefit
the communities. Both consumers' and producers' cooperatives were
organized and aided by ample loans. They became good experiments in
cooperation, but never solved the economic problems. Tugwell loved the
use of cooperatives, and defied the enemies of these experiments, rejoicing
that the government was finally organizing the sheep instead of aiding
the wolves. The principle of the cooperative farm, the village form of
agriculture, and the long term leases were the most important departures
from traditional American agriculture and the ones most criticized.
Suburban Resettlement Division
The inherited communities were often considered a burden and a
liability pushed upon the R.A. by other agencies and their many problems
could be blamed on other men. Such was not the case of the communities
planned and initiated by the Resettlement Administration. The garden
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cities or greenbelt towns had been projected in the early New Deal days
and were closest to Tugwell's heart. Immediately following the creation
of the R.A., Tugwell had charted a program for the Suburban Resettlement
Division which included twenty-five suburban communities. Limited appro-
priations and a court decision lowered to three the number actually con-
structed, but these three communities--Greenbelt, Maryland; Greenhills,
Ohio; and Greendale, Wisconsin—were by far the largest and most important
constructed by the New Deal. They were so different from a majority of
the other communities that they represent an almost isolated aspect of
the Resettlement Administration.
A serious obstacle to the Resettlement Administration came in the
form of a lawsuit brought against it by the citizens near Bound Brook,
in Franklin Township, New Jersey. A greenbelt town, Greenbrook, New
Jersey, was planned for that area, and in essence, the citizens were suing
because they objected to the loss of tax revenue, since the R.A. could
pay no taxes, to the location of the project, to the type of architecture
planned (fearing the concrete slab construction tried at Jersey Homesteads),
to the low class of people they believed would live in the project, and
32
to the purchase of such a large amount of land (needed for a greenbelt).
When the first injunction was denied, the citizens of Franklin Township
filed a new one in Washington, D.C. against Tugwell himself, with Dean
Acheson as one of their attorneys. The court ruled that the whole Emer-
gency Relief Act of 1935 was unconstitutional, as Congress unlawfully
delegated through its legislative powers to the President by not specify-
ing the actual programs which would be financed by the appropriation under
the act. The R.A. program was declared in opposition to state rights,
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as there was no constitutional power for the government to regulate hous-
ing or to resettle populations. One day after the decision, the Attorney
General ruled that the decision, despite its sweeping language, applied
only to the Greenbrook project, the only one included in the injunction.
The result of the decision was that the Greenbrook project was discon-
tinued.
Many aspects of the resettlement program were not based on wide
public support, despite attempts to maintain good public relations. Tugwell
believed in broad, delegated executive powers which would permit the wide
leeway needed by planners and experts. He was disdainful of congressmen,
who, to him,' often failed to represent the best interests of their con-
stituents. He also doubted the efficiency of the slow legislative pro-
cess, particularly in times o x emergency. Therefore Tugwell, with his
broad authority under the executive order, set up a large administration
and initiated an ambitious program without any clear mandate from Congress.
The Resettlement Administration itself was legislator and executor, and
many of the policy decisions nade by the R.A. staff would ne\ier have had
majority support in Congress. Tugwell probably realized this, yet he felt
that his staff, much more than Congress with its conflicting interests,
knew what the lower third of rural and urban America needed. And so he
set out, in a limited sense, to make America over, whether it wanted it
or not. Just when he had begun the task, he began to face opposition from
the courts, from the public, and from Congress. Many congressmen resented
his usurping their power, and his program was doomed unless it found favor
with a majority of congressmen, for Congress controlled the purse strings.
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Both Tugwell personally and the resettlement communities were
objects of attack in the election of 1936. As early as March 1936, the
Republican National Committee had declared that the Resettlement Admin-
istration was setting up communist farms.
3
By election time it was
rumored that the Resettlement Administration would soon be absorbed by
the Department of Agriculture. Tugwell, already planning his resignation
from government service, wanted a more permanent status for the Resettle-
ment Administration and had been urging Roosevelt to place it in the
Department of Agriculture. Tugwell then gave only personal reasons for
his resignation, although there was much speculation in Washington about
the old feud within the Department of Agriculture between liberals and
conservatives, and about his long time role as "whipping boy" for the
Department of Agriculture and, at times, for the whole New Deal. Years
later Tugwell hinted that it was really Roosevelt who desired his resigna-
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tion, not for personal reasons but for political expediency. His
resignation from both the Resettlement Administration and the Department
of Agriculture was December 31, 1936, at which time his Resettlement Admin-
istration, by an executive order, became part of the Department of Agri-
culture.
After its transfer to the Department of Agriculture, the Resettle-
ment Administration's community building program was slowly revised. A
greater emphasis was placed on the infiltration type of resettlement, and
experimentation in construction was replaced by standard designs. It was
decided that construction efforts would be centered on the completion of
projects already underway, as the Senate came very close to deducting
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$14,000,000 from the 1937 R.A. appropriation in order to show its desire
to have all old projects completed before new ones were started.
By June 1937, the Resettlement Administration had completed the
construction of only thirty-eight communities, while eight-four projects,
including communities and scattered farms, were under construction. The
remaining projects were all finished by the Farm Security Administration.
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Only 4,441 families were in residence at the time.
Inside the Resettlement Admin-
istration Communities
One of the most interesting aspects of the New Deal communities
was the fervent attempt to revive handicrafts, such as weaving, wood-
working, and metal work. In the early days of the Division of Subsistence
Homesteads, many people, including K. L. Wilson, Eleanor Roosevelt, and
Clarence Pickett, believed (undoubtedly influenced strongly by Ralph
Borsodi) that a revival of these handicrafts could provide part of the
income of subsistence farmers, invoke a community spirit, and lead to a
restored pride in workmanship, the latter so lacking in assembly line
America.
Cooperation was to be the real key to the new society. The whole
history of the New Deal communities could be related to the idea of co-
operation, replacing competition. From M. L. Wilson, who thought coopera-
tion was the only means of retaining democratic institutions, to Tugwell
,
whose desire for a collectivized, cooperative society was all-consuming,
the New Deal communities would epitomize cooperation as the new alternative
to the economic insecurity and chaos of the past. Among the services,
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facilities, and activities organized on cooperative bases in the various
communities were the following: pastures, dairies, wood lots, greenhouses,
rock quarries, cattle breeding, canneries, barbershops, gristmills,
orchards, inns, restaurants, hospitals, medical associations, blacksmith
shops, farm equipment, cotton gins, hatcheries, sawmills, freezing plants,
and even a burial association (which would be a real money saver today).
The medical cooperatives were evidently the most successful. By 1941,
over 100,000 families were included in the Farm Security Administration
j< i 37medical program.
The Resettlement Administration realized that the project inhab-
itants would not be able to operate successful cooperatives without
supervision and education, so it initiated a program of cooperative
education, utilizing reading materials and lectures given by cooperative
specialists in the field.
Although cooperation was desired as a substitute for individual
enterprise, many projects found cooperative endeavors a matter of economic
necessity rather than ideology. Because Congress had forbidden govern-
ment factories on community projects and the Comptroller General (McCarl
)
refused to allow the R.A. to use government funds to subsidize private
industries on the projects, the cooperative associations were used as the
only remaining device to bring employment to the economically stranded
communities. The consumer cooperatives, no matter how successful, could
provide employment to only a few project members, as they were service
rather than productive enterprises. The great need remained for some
type of industry.
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On June 21, 1937, the Resettlement Administration, after clearance
from the Comptroller General, went ahead with plans that had been frus-
trated since 1935. Several loan agreements were made with cooperative
associations on stranded projects to establish industrial enterprises. A
total of $4,328,000 was lent to the cooperative associations for invest-
ment in plants and early operating expenses. In each case the cooperative
association worked out a managerial agreement with a private industry.
The cooperatives' venture into private industry was successful in
only one respect--it provided, at least for a few years, jobs and a degree
of economic security to the occupants of the projects. But to the coop-
erative associations, to the government, and even to the private indus-
tries involved, the enterprises were financial failures. The hosiery
mills, pants factories, woodworking plant, tractor assembly plant, and
others, all had to shut down, and the consensus by technical experts who
investigated was that poor management was the cause.
The cooperative associations were supposed to serve one other
purpose, that of giving the homesteaders a voice in managing their own
community, and where they were all assured one equal vote. Even when the
first communities were turned over to the homesteaders, ownership and
management were placed, not in the individuals, but in cooperative home-
stead associations. The Farm Security Administration, with its large in-
vestment at stake, was afraid to turn the cooperative associations over
to the inexperienced people of a community. Therefore, their participa-
tion in their cooperatives was often a mere formality, with either the
project manager or a cooperative manager making all the important decisions.
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The government colonies were peopled with American farmers, who
had a deeply ingrained sense of individualism and no cohesive ideology.
Many of them were ready to live in a cooperative colony when, in the de-
pression, it offered them the only security they could find. But once
on the project, settlers often disliked depending upon their less capable
neighbors. Their central goal soon became farms of their own, where they
could be free and independent. At Casa Grande, Arizona, the farm direc-
tor resigned in 1939, calling the project a Russian cooperative. Too
often the homesteaders were overly idealistic in their expectations about
their new homes and, when disappointed at the reality, became bitter
toward the government. Policies were changed in Washington, and the
homesteaders felt cheated. The large expenses in construction often
aroused fears of such high purchase prices that the homesteader could
never afford them. More than anything else, the long delay in granting
purchase contracts led to dissatisfaction. Yet, by 1942, in the subsis-
tence homesteads projects retained by the F.S.A., there had been a low
turnover of 18 percent, much of this due to new employment, indicating
that the new communities, even with their problems, were better than
anything else available.
The Greenbelt Towns
The greenbelt towns remain the grandest monuments of Rexford G.
Tugwell's work in the Resettlement Administration. They represented
the most daring, original, and ambitious experiments in public housing
in the history of the United States. Although only three of approx-
imately 100 New Deal communities, the greenbelt towns absorbed over
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one-third of the total cost and nearly one-fourth of the total settlers
of the whole community program.
The three completed greenbelt cities represented the culmination
of the garden city movement in America, combining the principal ideas
of Ebenezer Howard with the new, automobile influenced planning tech-
niques first attempted at Radburn, New Jersey. The two planners of
Radburn, Clarence Stein and Henry Wright, both participated in the Re-
settlement Administration program. Tugwell while acknowledging the
influence of Howard and the English garden city movement, stressed the
fact that the greenbelt idea also came from a study of contemporary
population movements which showed a steady growth in the periphery of
cities. He believed that the suburban movement, then a new frontier,
gave the best chance ever offered for the governmental planning of a
favorable working and living environment. Past opportunities for federal
planning had been ignored, with urban slums and rural poverty the results,
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and he felt this new area offered a last chance.
As conceived by Tugwell, the greenbelt city was to be a complete
community of a limited size, encircled by a greenbelt of farms, owned
collectively, with common utilities, and with gardens. The subsistence
feature of the other suburban communities was not emphasized in the green-
belt cities, which were planned as full cities, with eventual populations
of up to 10,000. They were more closely related to the urban housing
programs than any other communities, designed to place land, houses, and
people together in such a way as to strengthen the foundations of the
whole structure of the society.
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The Suburban Resettlement Division studied the economic background
of 100 cities in the United States, learning the rate of population growth,
the numbers employed in industry, wages paid, population trends after
1900, volume of manufacturing, and the diversity of industries and
occupations. From these 100 cities, twenty-five were picked for further
study. Tugwell envisioned greenbelt towns for all twenty-five of these
cities, but he never received nearly the appropriation he desired. Finally,
the program was reduced to four communities--on the outskirts of Wash-
ington, D.C., Cincinnati, Ohio, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and New York City.
Before construction began, the last was blocked by a court injunction
(Bound Brook, New Jersey vs. Tugwell, mentioned earlier).
The actual suburban sites were selected on the basis of a careful
study of population trends, topography, land prices, and availability
of employment. On these bases the sites were selected for Greenbelt at
Berwyn, Maryland, about seven miles from Washington, for Greenhills, a
site about five miles north of Cincinnati, and for Greendale, a valley
three miles southwest of Milwaukee.
The Suburban Resettlement Division was completely responsible for
the planning of the greenbelt cities. Under its head, John S. Lansill,
were three relatively autonomous planning teams, one for each city, with
each team having lots of freedom to allow the maximum possibility for new
ideas and new approaches. Each greenbelt city became a distinct experi-
ment in itself. Each planning team was headed by a group of equal rank,
including one or more town planners, one or more engineers, one or more
architects, and a regional coordinator.
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In 1936 and 1937 the construction progress was rapid, with an
average monthly employment of over 7,000 on the three projects. At
Greenbelt the construction program absorbed all the unemployed relief
labor in Washington and in the adjacent Maryland counties. The first
units were occupied at Greenbelt in September 1937, at Greenhills in
May 1933, and at Greendale in June 1938. When completed the three pro-
jects contained 2,267 family units and complete community facilities,
at a cost of over 336,000,000.
Greenbelt, Maryland
For Greenbelt, Maryland, the Resettlement Administration purchased
12,259 acres of submarginal land located next to the Department of Agri-
culture's National Research Center near College Park, Maryland. Eight
thousand, six hundred and fifty-nine acres were placed under the jurisdic-
tion of the Research Center, which formed part of the greenbelt, and 217
acres were used for the town, 500 acres reserved fo" future expansion,
250 acres for parks, 107 acres for allotment gardens, 20 acres for a
county high school, and the rest remained in surplus and woodland, both
available for recreation. Greenbelt was planned as a dormitory town for
Washington, which was experiencing rapid growth and a severe housing
shortage. Unlike the English garden cities, Greenbelt was not planned
for any industry of its own. Unlike the other greenbelt cities, Green-
belt did not contain any farms in its greenbelt, primarily because the
land was not suitable for farming. However, the Research Center was a
contiguous farming area.
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The physical design of Greenbelt became famous. As a garden city
it was to be limited in size by the greenbelt, and was to be under public
ownership. As in Radburn, it had extra large blocks, internal parks,
separation of pedestrians and automobiles, and pedestrian underpasses.
The dwelling units were largely located in five superblocks of from fifteen
to twenty acres each. As at Radburn the houses or apartments faced two
ways, toward a central park and pedestrian walkways on one side and
toward the service entrances or cul-de-sacs on the other. Skirting the
large blocks were the streets, limited by the design, to a total of only
six miles. The parks in the center of each block were connected to each
other by pedestrian underpasses. An underpass also connected the housing
areas with the community center. A man made lake of twenty-five acres
near the community center enhanced the beauty of the site.
Because of limited funds, the Resettlement Administration completed
only 885 dwelling units at Greenbelt (1,000 had been planned). Of these,
only five were detached, single family homes, whereas 574 were in multiple
dwelling row houses and 306 in larger apartment buildings. Despite the
multiple dwellings the housing density was only seven families per acre.
The housing units varied in size from tiny one-bedroom apartments to
seven-room dwellings.
The community center was planned as the heart of Greenbelt. It
contained the community building, which was leased during the day to the
county for an elementary school, the fire engine, the gas station, an inn
and restaurant, the movie theater, and a mercantile center, which included
a food and general merchandise store, a drugstore, a barbershop, a beauty
shop, and a dry cleaning and valet shop. The community center also had a
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playground, an outdoor swimming pool, and an athletic field. Other play-
grounds, play boxes, and open areas were interspersed throughout the town,
and the lake and greenbelt formed perfect natural playgrounds. The
shopping center followed Ebenezer Howard's idea of a restricted market.
Only one shop was allowed for each business or service, and all were
under community control. A consolidated county high school was constructed
by Prince George County near the town and on the very edge of the green-
belt.
Greenhills, Ohio
In September, 1935, the R.A. optioned 5,930 acres of farmland
about eleven miles north of downtown Cincinnati. This was the site for
Greenhills. The Cincinnati area was picked for a greenbelt city because
of the density of industry, the proportionately large number of people
engaged in industry, and the local housing shortage. Only about 1,300
acres of the roughest terrain were utilized in the central town, leaving
over 4,000 acres in farm or woodland. Unlike Greenbelt, the site for
Greenhills contained about thirty large farms and an equal number of
subsistence farms. These farms already had homes and out-buildings and
were only repaired by the Resettlement Administration. The farms were
leased to tenants under five year leases, some eroded areas were re-
forested, and the R.A. helped the farmers work out crop plans. It was
hoped that the farms could supply Greenhills with farm products, which
were to be marketed through a farmers' market in the town. In actuality
42
the farmers sold most of their products in Cincinnati.
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Unlike Greenbelt, the site for Greenhills was crossed by a main
highway. The roads and topography led to several narrow curving building
areas separated from each other by the ravines or the roads. Thus, al-
though there were several superblocks with cul-de-sacs and central park
areas, much of the town consisted of single, fingerlike cul-de-sacs or
small circular drives, both surrounded by the natural scenery. The com-
munity center, near the center of the town and on the main highway, was
not as easily accessible by foot to all the homes as was the one at
Greenbelt, as it was designed for automobile travel. Therefore, Green-
hills was not planned with all the unique pedestrian facilities of
Greenbelt, but it did have the advantage of being situated in a much more
beautiful natural setting.
When completed, the town of Greenhills contained only 676 of a
planned 1,000 family units. These were divided into 24 detached, three
or four-bedroom, single family dwellings, 152 one and two-bedroom apart-
ments, and 500 two, three, or four-bedroom units in row or group houses.
Greendale, Wisconsin
The third greenbelt city, which contained 3,510 acres just to the
west of Milwaukee, was radically different in design from the other two
greenbelt towns. It was placed near Milwaukee because of the housing
shortage and the large percentage of people employed in industry. Planned
for only 750 units, Greendale was less like Radburn than the other two
cities. It had a small, ten-acre area reserved for light industry, al-
though none was established by the Resettlement Administration. Approx-
imately 1,830 acres were in farmland, with 13 full time dairy farms
87
and 53 small farms or subsistence units. A farm adviser was provided
by the Farm Security Administration, which remodeled or repaired many of
the farm buildings. Greendale was planned as a conventional country
village, with a few cul-de-sacs and several normal city blocks. It
contained only individual or small-group housing, being the largest
housing project of this nature in the northern United States. The com-
munity and business section resembled the business area of an average
village. Although in every way more conventional than Greenbelt or
Greenhills, Greendale was thought to be more desirable by most tenants
because of the predominance of individual houses. When completed, it
contained only 572 dwelling units in the city proper. Of these, 274 were
two and three-bedroom, detached, family dwellings, 90 were one, two, and
four-bedroom duplexes, while only 208 were in multiple family units. Un-
like those in the other two cities, the tenants at Greendale were in-
dividually responsible for their utilities. Also, Greendale 's community
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center was constructed by contract rather than by relief labor.
Greenbelt Towns in Operation
The first tenant moved into Greenbelt on September 30, 1937. By
that time, the Resettlement Administration had been besieged with over
12,000 applications for Greenbelt alone, making necessary a careful
process of selection. The express purpose of the greenbelt towns, to
serve low income workers, led to a wage ceiling of $2,200 for each family.
Preference was given to young married families with children, who were
living in poor housing but who could afford the rent to be charged at
the greenbelt cities. In all three cities, the new families were
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predominantly young people, with the adults at Greenbelt averaging only
thirty-one years old. In order to maintain high standards, the R.A.
enforced strict rules in the cities. At Greenbelt no dogs were per-
mitted, and no clothes were allowed to remain on the lines after four
in the afternoon. Contrary to many of the rural communities, a strict
rent discipline was maintained, with payments due in advance and eviction
an ever present reality, resulting in a very low rate of delinquency.
Although the greenbelt cities were satellites, economically
dependent upon their parent cities, they did contain their own retail
shopping centers. These permitted the usual emphasis upon cooperation.
Edward Filene, a merchant in Boston, gave SI, 000, 000 to further the
cooperative movement as the greenbelt cities were being constructed. The
Consumer Distribution Corporation, created with this Filene grant, leased
the commercial centers in the three greenbelt cities and had the stores
ready for operation when the residents arrived. The externally financed
cooperative service was to operate the stores only until the citizens
could establish their own consumers' cooperative. The cooperatives paid
limited dividends to each stockholder and other savings, if any, were
passed on to the consumers. Also organized cooperatively were the credit
unions and the group medical services. A typical medical plan, the one
at Greendale, cost one dollar a month per person, or three dollars for
a family.
According to the earliest plans, the greenbelt cities were to be
complete, incorporated towns with their own municipal governments. In
April 1937, months before completion, Greenbelt received a charter from
the Maryland legislature, which officially established it as the first
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Maryland town with a city manager type of government. Greendale and
Greenhills were similarly incorporated in 1938, each with the city manager
system. In each town the city manager was appointed by a democratically
elected city council. Since the F.S.A. had its own community manager in
each town, the town councils, for many years, also appointed him town
manager. The existence of three or four governmental units (state, county,
city, and federal) inevitably led to problems. The Farm Security Admin-
istration made payments in lieu of taxes not only to the county and state,
but also to the city government for specific services. Since the city
government could not tax the landowner—the federal government—most of
the money for public utilities, street repairs, maintenance, and police
and fire protection had to be provided by the federal government. Thus
the city council and town manager could only make suggestions as to needed
expenditures, getting the needed funds at the discretion of the F.S.A.
The greenbelt communities were constantly in the public eye, and
criticized mercilessly. Local opinion prevented Greenbrook's completion,
and a suit against Greendale was attempted unsuccessfully by the Milwaukee
building and loan associations. In Cincinnati the Real Estate Board, the
building and loan associations, and .the Chamber of Commerce all opposed
Greenhills. Real estate owners often feared lowered land values, and
local governments (such as Bound Brook, New Jersey) feared a loss in tax
revenue. The greenbelt cities--like all of Tugwell ' s ventures—were
treated unfairly in a majority of the newspapers, the New York American
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describing Greendale as "the first Communist town in America.
The most valid criticism of the greenbelt cities was directed at
their costs. Tugwell, when first beginning the greenbelt towns, had
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thoroughly condemned private enterprise for not entering the field of
low cost, prefabricated housing. Yet the average unit cost at Greenbelt
was $15,395, at Greenhills, $16,093, and at Greendale, 516,623. This
was not low cost housing. At the price rented it was highly subsidized
housing. According to the net income from rent at Greenbelt in 1941, it
would take over 300 years for Greenbelt to pay for itself. In defense
of the high costs, the F.S.A. logically argued that the use of unskilled
relief labor added over a third of the cost. Further, the unused green-
belt could not be charged to the homes, since it had retained its original
value. And the public and community facilities, usually furnished by
local governments, had been added to the costs. Finally, the greenbelt
cities had been constructed to accommodate over three times the original
population, meaning that any future expansion would cost only a fraction
as much per unit (proved at Greenbelt by the addition of wartime housing).
On the other hand, the greenbelt towns proved that no private corporation
could build complete towns, with all their facilities and an expensive
greenbelt, and then be able to rent them to low income families.
Compared to many other New Deal experiments, the community program
was relatively small in terms of final accomplishments, but had the
enthusiasm of Roosevelt and others behind it early on. The back-to-the-
land movement was a very romantic and appealing panacea in 1933. Its
appeal won the support of numerous congressmen who were opposed to many
of the other New Deal experiments. The community idea itself, whether
connected with subsistence homesteads or resettlement, was flexible enough
to appeal strongly to people with very diverse political beliefs, from
the most reactionary to the most radical, from Ralph Borsodi to Rexford G.
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Tugwell. In the abstract, most people favored planned communities or
towns, decentralization of industry, subsistence gardens, handicrafts,
and even cooperation. The community program died because of the con-
troversial ideas of some of its directors, the practical difficulties
encountered in implementing the community idea, the many problems re-
sulting from the uncoordinated and hasty actions of an unwieldy federal
government, an organized opposition to the New Deal itself, and a de-
clining sentiment for reform after 1936.
The most critical decision affecting the New Deal communities was
Roosevelt's choice of Tugwell to head the Resettlement Administration
in 1935. The communities then became only one element in an ambitious
program to reshape the face of rural and suburban America. As a director
of the community program, the controversial Tugwell 's collectivist ideas
did not express the majority sentiment in the United States, particularly
since that majority sentiment was shifting to the right. More than almost
any other person in the New Deal, Tugwell advocated a logical, consistent,
and thorough program of reform that touched on every aspect of the economy.
He possessed personal magnetism and an incisively logical, and not always
academic, appeal to American liberals. His political ineptitude, if
such existed, demonstrated his tenacious honesty and high personal in-
tegrity. As a director he did compromise, and he was a better, more con-
servative administrator than his opponents would ever admit. His ideas
of a collective society, to be achieved slowly and with hard work and
costly sacrifices, were far too radical for most Americans. At a time
when public opinion was becoming more conservative, the community program
was becoming more daring and experimental than ever before.
92
The community idea, so appealing in the abstract, was much more
difficult to achieve in actuality than almost anyone believed possible
in 1933. All too often the settlers themselves were not anxious to
participate in experimental reforms leading to a new America which they
could not understand or appreciate--they simply wanted economic security.
By Roosevelt's second term, an anti-New Deal coalition had formed
in Congress. Conservative Democrats joined with Republicans to police
relief expenditures and to oppose any new, large scale reforms. By 1938
the New Deal was completed. Roosevelt himself was becoming preoccupied
with foreign affairs, and seeking wider support, was accepting more
conservative advisers.
Just when the conservative opposition solidified in Congress in
1937 and 1938, the New Deal communities were at a critical period of
development. For the conservative opponents of the New Deal , the un-
successful communities offered perfect ammunition. They were to be
exploited for propaganda purposes until after the congressional inves-
tigation of the Farm Security Administration in 1943. If Tugwell had
launched his Resettlement Administration program in 1933, and could have
completed it by 1936, he probably would have achieved many of his goals
without serious congressional opposition.
In retrospect, the program appears to have been most valuable in
revealing the problems of detailed social planning and of effecting a
rapid transition from an individualistic to a more col lectivistic society.
The greenbelt cities have been widely influential in the city planning
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movement, and the excellent physical designs and the present day pros-
perity of most of the New Deal communities seem to have set right some
of the early mistakes. It is unfortunate that the long political con-
troversy which surrounded the Resettlement Administration and the Farm
Security Administration has completely colored the memory of the New Deal
communities, obscuring most of their virtues and magnifying all of their
shortcomings.
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CHAPTER III
COMMUNITIES IN COOPERATION
...in the ethical progress of man, mutual support--not mutual
struggle--has had the leading part.
--Peter Kropotkin*
In spite of its original intention, the Resettlement Administra-
tion retained ownership of the greenbelt towns. This situation greatly
interfered with the towns' political , economic, and social institutions,
and ultimately jeopardized the entire program. The R.A. stated that it
did not want the greenbelt towns to be "federal islands," but rather
normal American communities in which everyone had his share of both
duties and privileges. 1 Both Tugwell and the officials under him firmly
stated that the federal government would divest itself of ownership after
the towns were complete, and the R.A.'s early press releases and other
publications indicated the towns would become normal, tax paying com-
munities. In December, 1935, Tugwell decided to transfer ownership of
the towns to the people living in them. Residents would be citizens of
the state, pay all state and local taxes, and retire their mortgage with
the R.A. from rent payments to their own privately controlled housing
authority. It was thought that the housing authority would sign a con-
tract whereby the R.A. would administer the projects for a certain number
of years.
97
98
However, further analysis revealed this plan to be financially un-
feasible. Stein's report on operation maintenance costs was based on a
projected income level averaging $1,250 and indicated that the towns
would have to have at least 1,000 units simply to pay maintenance costs.
2
Mortgage payments were not included in this study. As the total cost
of Greenbelt rose, the planners tried to increase the number of units—
in July 1936, Greenbelt was raised from 1,000 to 1,300 units, but this
was cut back the next month to 1,250. During the fall it was reduced
again to the 885 units then under construction, putting Greenbelt below
Stein's figure for minimum pay-as-you-go services, not to mention Green-
3
hills with only 672 units and Greendale with 572.
The Resettlement Administration was in a true dilemma--if the
towns were transferred to a private housing corporation, rents would have
to exceed the amount that low or moderate income families could afford.
This would not only contradict all the intentions of the R.A., but also
might be an illegal use of the project funds under the executive order
directing the R.A. to resettle destitute or low income families. Con-
versely, if the R.A. were to sell the towns at a price the residents could
afford, the result would amount to a gigantic subsidy for a very small
number of people. The third alternative was for the R.A. to retain owner-
ship of the towns.
Greenbelt and Greenhills were incorporated with the same mayor-
council -manager type of municipal government, and Greendale became an in-
dependent municipality known as a village. The three communities did
have municipal charters, and the tenants could establish their own
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governments. All the Resettlement Administration administrators agreed
that these should be chartered independently of the federal government.
However, they would be necessarily subordinate to the landlord—the R.A.--
which would maintain its own staff of administrators in each community.
The decision to retain the towns under federal ownership had a
number of advantages. It kept viable the possibility of completing the
towns if Congress appropriated funds at a later date. It prevented the
extensive undeveloped lands from falling into the hands of private de-
velopers who might use them without regard to the general town plans.
It allowed the possibility of resettling increasingly lower income
families in the towns after they became established in their localities
as positive communities. The towns could, if Congress desired, become
unique laboratories for experiments in housing, town planning, and com-
munity organization. Congress never gave any serious thought to this
possibility during the 15 years in which the towns existed as half for-
gotten federal suburbs.
Democracy and Cooperation
The creators of the greenbelt towns wanted both a planned harmony
of physical elements and the growth of political, social, and economic
cooperation among the residents. Through democracy residents would build
a society in which there would be both individual freedom and mutual aid
through cooperative institutions. The program was a blend of the New
England town meeting, the mutual aid of frontier towns, and the economic
cooperatives of twentieth century farmers—all transmuted to the suburbs
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for white and blue collar workers rather than farmers. The greenbelt
cooperative program was clearly more radical as a demonstration for the
rest of the nation to observe and follow than the physical planning.
The physical town could be imitated by the construction industry without
major manufacturing, but the appeal of economic cooperation to a majority
of consumers, as well as manufacturers, would work a fundamental change
in the American economic system.
The towns needed a grass roots democratic structure not only to
direct socioeconomic cooperation, but also to provide the normal services
of an independent municipality. The federal government held all the
land, but the residents possessed the keys to local political power
through the charters of incorporation. If these residents had moved into
a typical public housing project they would have noticed few changes
beyond improved sanitation and prompt repairs. But by moving into one
of the greenbelt towns, with all the physical, economic, and legal trap-
pings of an independent town, each resident achieved legal rights,
political powers, and a common identity with other citizens that was
quite impossible in a housing project. The further fact that the towns
were without established patterns and institutions and were located
several miles from the nearest community forced the first generation of
residents to establish their own new society--a task which, for several
years, radically changed their lives.
The residents disciplined themselves against any tendency to de-
pendence on the Farm Security Administration. An editorial in the Green -
belt Cooperator critized those who would turn to the government for funds
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and equipment as supportive of criticism that people would only demand
more if anything were given to them. In August 1938, when the possible
building of a recreation center was being discussed, the Cooperator asked
5
that citizens either pay for it themselves or forget the idea. The
Greendale Citizens' Association discussing a proposal to build a com-
munity center separate from the school, also decided not to seek govern-
ment funds. The majority of residents believed the F.S.A. had done
enough for them and that they should furnish their own building. Even
during the local recession in 1939, when Greendale residents sought fed-
eral aid for unemployment relief, they established their own Labor
Relations Committee to find jobs for the unemployed of their town, and
set up an Exchange of Skills Office where a list of available jobs and
another of those with particular skills were kept.
Unquestionably, the towns relied on federal officials—particularly
the community/ town manager—for initial direction and continuing advice.
But the local societies and institutions developed for the most part
because of the enthusiasm and efforts of almost every citizen. During
the first year at Greenbelt approximately thirty-five organizations were
founded in addition to many temporary committees. Almost every adult
belonged to at least one organization or committee.
One reason for the frenetic activity of the townspeople derives
from their backgrounds. Most came from poor sections of Washington where
they had had few opportunities for social organization and no city govern-
ment to which they could contribute—as one might expect, they were cul-
turally and politically starved. Their general educational backgrounds
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were unusually high. In 1940 the median school year completed by Green-
belt residents over 25 years of age was 12.5. Approximately 65 percent
had completed high school, 34 percent had some college education, and
only 3 percent had less than eighth grade education. The national
median educational level in 1940 for whites over 25 was 8.75 years of
school. In 1950, the national median was still only 10.6 years.
The growth and subsequent disintegration of cooperation in Green-
belt can be traced through its major institutions. The two major political
institutions were the town council and the citizens' association. The
council was established in the town charter as the official representative
of the citizens, and its five elected members chose Louis Bessemer as
chairman, thus mayor, a man who was a long time member of the District
of Columbia Cooperative League. The Citizens' Association shared the
municipal chores with the town council, establishing many committees to
investigate numerous problems. During periods of controversy the Citizens'
Association operated as a town meeting, providing communication channels
between the residents and the town council or the federal government.
The day after the election of the town council (November 23, 1937),
residents saw the first edition of the Greenbelt Cooperator . Founded by
the new Journalism Club, the paper remains today a nonprofit enterprise
staffed by volunteers. It is the only one of the three greenbelt town
papers which has survived as an independent local newspaper, and is an
invaluable record of Greenbelt's development. The consumer cooperative
movement was supported against the charge by J. B. Matthews, research
director for the House Un-American Activities Committee (Dies Committee),
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that communists were working through consumer organizations to destroy the
American profit system. The Cooperator pointed out that Matthews had
previously been vice president of Consumers Research, a private group
opposed to the consumer cooperative movement.
The Greenbelt Consumer Cooperative founded in January of 1940, was
the keystone in Greenbelt's structure of mutual aid. It survived the
sale of the town and because of careful management, has expanded into
Baltimore, Washington, and northern Virginia. A consumer co-op to operate
the retail establishments at the three towns had been planned for a long
time by the Resettlement Administration, who hoped to loan the residents
funds repayable through the sale of stock and the proceeds of sales. How-
ever, no action was taken, and the R.A. was merged with the Department
of Agriculture. The solicitor of the department said that no loans could
be made to the town coops because all funds allocated to the R.A., and
thus to the F.S.A., were for rural rehabilitation. The F.S.A. then turned
to the Consumer Distribution Corporation financed by the Boston merchant,
Edward A. Filene, who established a subsidiary called Greenbelt Consumer
Services, which had exclusive right to operate all commercial facilities
in Greenbelt. These included a supermarket, valet shop, barber shop,
beauty parlor, motion picture theater, and a gasoline station. Rent for
the buildings was based on a percentage of the sales, and was comparable
to the ratio for privately rented stores. The G.C.S. was a nonprofit,
self-liquidating subsidiary, which would return all profits to the con-
sumers and turn over ownership to Greenbelt residents by December 31,
1940. During 1938 and 1939, a large number of Greenbelt residents
organized a Greenbelt Consumer Co-op, selling $5,000 worth of stock
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at $10.00 per share to over 400 residents. On January 2, 1940, Greenbelt
Consumer Services was sold to the resident stockholders for $40,000
,
$5,000 of which was paid in cash and the balance in the form of a Con-
sumer Distribution Corporation loan at four percent interest, was paid
g
off over the following six years.
A survey of the Greenbelt Coop by the University of Maryland in
1940 revealed that sixty-seven percent of the residents had purchased
stock, and generally, it was in a strong financial position. The super-
market accounted for half the coop's revenue, and average food prices
were nine percent lower than District of Columbia chain stores and 9.3
percent lower than independent food stores. It could have charged even
lower prices had it not been for Maryland's retail price maintenance law.
All members (stockholders) of the coop, received dividends on their pur-
chases, and in 1940 these amounted to 3.85 percent.
In 1943, after 1,000 defense homes had been completed in Greenbelt,
the coop stores expanded, and a second food store opened adjacent to the
new homes. The government also depended on the Greenbelt Consumer Co-
operative for new services such as operation of a swimming pool opened
in 1939 and a local bus service from 1945 to 1951. A large turnover of
residents, thus of shareholders, weakened the institution. The addition
of the defense homes, however, increased membership, and in November 1944,
the coop hired a new general manager, and launched an expansion program
which helped it survive the sale of the town and the opening of com-
petitive private retail stores.
The Greenbelt Health Association, like the Credit Union, was estab-
lished to take care of immediate needs--there was no doctor in Greenbelt
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and no hospital in Prince George's County. The Health Association was
patterned after a consumer-owned clinic in Washington, founded in 1937
by federal employees. It started with seventy-five families each of
whom contributed a $5.00 entry fee and a monthly payment of $1.50 for a
single person to S2.25 for a family of six. By December 1938. 212
families had joined, and on April 1, 1938, the Greenbelt Health Asso-
ciation opened a clinic with a doctor whose salary was paid to treat
members, although he could treat nonmembers on a fee-for-service basis.
This arrangement did not suit the doctor, and he resigned, two more being
hired in his place. One of these, Dr. Joseph Still, was enthusiastic
about cooperative health associations and through his efforts Greenbelt
opened a small twelve-bed hospital in May 1939. In January 1942, the
F.S.A. essentially destroyed the association by refusing to pay $23,000
to cover the hospital expenses for fiscal 1942. The town held a referen-
dum to determine if the residents wanted to pay the cost themselves, and
decided not to. One reason given for rejection was that the county was
constructing a hospital in Riverdale, which was nearby. Despite protests
to the F.S.A. and an appeal to Mrs. Roosevelt, the hospital closed on
January 31, 1942, and its only doctor left two months later. In March
1944, the Federal Public Housing Administration ruled that private doctors
could open offices in Greenbelt, and the membership declined steadily
12
until the last 180 members dissolved the organization in June 1950.
The women of Greenbelt organized a cooperative nursery school
which was the first in Prince George's County. In addition, they started
a Better Buyers' Club which studied products, labeling, and consumer
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legislation. The elementary school children even organized a coop for
selling candy, pencils, and other small items, selling shares for ten
cents, and the first profits were distributed by the end of the first
half of the year.
The spirit of cooperation in the early years was strong enough to
have unusual influences. In November 1939, the Citizens' Association and
the town council firmly rejected the suggestion of a group of residents
that Negroes be excluded from the supermarket lunch counter. This is
notable in light of the rigid segregation in the county and the rest of
Maryland. Also surprising for the time was the decision of the coop
board of directors not to show the film "Birth of a Nation" at the
Greenbelt Theater on the grounds that it was racist.
The cooperative spirit flourished in the other two towns but did
not maintain its early momentum to the degree seen at Greenbelt. The
Greendale Cooperative Association was started by the residents in the
summer of 1938, and a cooperative committee was formed which decided to
follow Greenbelt 's example and establish a consumer cooperative to operate
Greendale' s commercial facilities. The Co-op was incorporated in August
1938, with a loan from the Consumer Distribution Corporation, which also
financed the Greenbelt co-op. The Greendale Cooperative Association leased
the commercial center from the F.S.A., and established a food store, a
variety store, a drug store, movie theater, shoe repair and valet shop,
barber shop, beauty parlor, tavern/restaurant, and a gasoline station.
At its third annual meeting in 1941, the Greendale Cooperative
Association, which had been a subsidiary of the Midland Cooperative
Association from whom the staff had initially borrowed money to begin,
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became independent, fit that time all its enterprises were earning a net
profit. After the war the Public Housing Administration (P.H.A.) leased
several of the stores to private proprietors because the Co-op no longer
wanted to operate them, and in 1948, the P.H.A. refused to renew the
leases on remaining Co-op businesses and opened them to competitive bid-
ding. The Co-op lost the food store, the variety store, and the barber
shop, retaining only the tavern/restaurant and the gas station. The Co-op
disbanded in December 1948. Co-op directors blamed the P.H.A. for its
failures, out the accuracy of this is questionable, as Greendale was the
smallest of the greenbelt towns and was located closer to private stores
than any of the other towns. While the Co-op stores sold to a few people
outside Greendale, the town residents traded in much larger numbers with
outside competitors.
Greendale also attempted to establish a coperative medical organi-
zation and two groups were established in 1933. The Greendale Medical
Union failed after several months of operation. The Greendale Health
Association, founded with the help of the Milwaukee Medical Center,
functioned successfully until after the war when, its doctors pressured
by Milwaukee hospitals, other area doctors, and P.H.A. sanctioned competi-
tion from private physicians in Greendale, it merged with the Milwaukee
Medical Center.
The Greenhills Consumer Services survives today, but on a much
smaller scale than that of the Greenbelt co-op. As in the other two towns,
a consumer cooperative was established, with the aid of the Co-operative
League of Cincinnati and a loan from Filene's Consumer Distribution Cor-
poration. In April 1938, when there were only 100 families in the town,
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a meeting was held at which a committee presented the co-op plan, and it
was immediately adopted by unanimous vote. In 1939, the Co-op signed a
ten-year lease with the F.S.A. for the commercial center and opened all
the usual shops, and by 1940 about 400 residents were members. During
the war the Co-op ran into financial trouble (a number of the residents
were not pleased with the Co-op and preferred private chain stores) and
divested itself of all businesses except the food and drug stores. In
1954 the food store built a new and larger structure and in 1960 opened
a second store in the nearby community of Mt. Healthy. By 1962 total
sales had risen from $200,000 in 1940 to $2,200,000. This is small com-
pared to the Greenbelt co-op sales which in 1962 were over $20,000,000.
A question is why cooperative enterprise disintegrated at Green-
dale, declined at Greenhills, and expanded at Greenbelt. One reason may
lie in the smaller sizes of the other two towns compared to Greenbelt,
thus making it much harder to support the variety of business operated
by the co-ops. If Greendale's co-op had consolidated its efforts in the
food and drug stores during the war as the Greenhills co-op did, it might
have survived. In addition, the Greenbelt co-op met its competition with
expansion of its own facilities, through a stock sale to its residents
from 1945 to 1947, resulting in the construction of a larger, modern
supermarket in 1948. In the period 1954-56, when Greenbelt was adjusting
to its sale, the co-op made some basic policy decisions which have had
lasting effect. All of its Greenbelt business except the food, drug, and
general merchandise stores which were consolidated in the supermarket
through a $200,000 extension of the building, were ended. The small
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service station in the commercial center was also abandoned, but in its
place the Co-op opened a $100,000 automobile service plaza. Thus, while
divesting itself of less profitable businesses, the total operation of
the Co-op expanded, as did its membership. Finally, the Co-op absorbed
the Westminister Cooperative in nearby Carroll County in 1956 and in 1959
merged with the Rochdale Cooperative in Prince George's County, which
brought both more members and two more supermarkets. By 1967, Greenbelt
Consumer Services had become a major business with 17,000 members and
fourteen retail stores in the Baltimore-Washington area.
It seems that cooperative democracy atrophied as a result of
special circumstances in each individual community, but there were also
common causes. The residents were unwilling or unable to devote the
time and energy necessary to establish and maintain the required highly
participatory democracy, and they lacked the money to hire enough people
to handle the administration. Cooperative endeavors particularly re-
quire continuous citizen support, and participatory democracy and economic
cooperation thrived in the early years because it was new and exhilarating
as a unique experience, but soon became institutionalized and therefore
less emotionally satisfying. The structure was also weakened by families
moving in and out of towns faster than they could be assimilated into the
demanding community institutions. Permanence of residency was made dif-
ficult by the F.S.A., but the coming of the Second World War made it im-
possible. If, in fact, local democracy and economic cooperation require
a relatively stable population, this alone would explain the change of
the greenbelt towns into more traditional suburban communities.
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R.P.A.A. and Cooperative Housing
The R.P.A.A. 's approach to the problem of housing and development
costs was never limited to innovations in site planning scale and pro-
cedures alone; cost analysis pervaded its entire community planning
synthesis resulting in a new conception of government's role in housing.
The City Housing Corporation, which limited dividends to six percent,
was midway between the strictly commercial investor and the philanthropic
fund and cooperative. Both the limited dividend company and philan-
thropic fund had been devised around the nid-nineteenth century to supply
better housing at lower rents for urban workers than the commercial de-
veloper could offer.
Apart from an experimental and demonstration value, the philan-
thropic trust was obviously useless as a financial or administrative
device to supply low cost housing in substantial quantities. The co-
operative idea was more promising, but far more successful in Europe than
in the United States, where labor support and government financial
assistance were lacking. Many of the so-called cooperatives of the 1920's
provided for joint management and ownership of common areas such as halls,
but they did not preclude individual lease or sale of apartments at a
profit. Private builders erected and sold them to individuals whose stock
determined their voting power. In the genuine cooperative each member
possessed one vote without regard to capital holdings, and he owned stock
in the organization rather than individual apartments--these belonged to
the society, which had first option on redemption of stock.
The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics showed only forty
cooperative housing societies in existence during the mid 1920's. All
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but two of these were in New York City. The Bureau collected data on
thirty-two of the societies--twenty-two in Brooklyn, nine in Manhattan,
and one in Wisconsin. America's meager cooperative housing tradition,
like the innovations in residential design described earlier, was dis-
tinctively a product of the 1920' s . Only two of the societies were in
existence before 1920. Cooperative housing in the United States,
representing one method of reducing costs or rentals, was not only
scanty but frequently unsuccessful. The Milwaukee Garden Homes Company
failed as a cooperative venture, and two apartments at Sunnyside spon-
sored by the Cooperative League proved less successful than dwellings
for sale or rent.
The City Housing Corporation differed from previous limited
dividend companies in that its sponsors sought to establish a permanent
partnership between government and cooperative or limited dividend organi-
zations, wherein direct government financial assistance would increase
the supply of low cost capital available for non-commercial housing
operations. In more general terms, the R.P.A.A. focussed attention upon
the relationship between the quantity and quality of housing, and the
amount and cost of capital. Its members strongly challenged the tradi-
tional assumption that government's role in housing was limited to minimum
standards legislation. Throughout the 1920's, the R.P.A.A. pressed for
the establishment of financial mechanisms to channel government capital
into the housing market to benefit income groups which existing lending
and building institutions did not satisfactorily accommodate. Clarence
Stein assumed the pivotal role in the R.P.A.A. 's efforts to increase the
supply and diminish the cost of capital available for non-speculative
housing.
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Bryn Gweled--A Thriving Cooperative Community
A contemporary example of a successful cooperative community
which was established in the late years of the New Deal, is Bryn Gweled
Homesteads, near Philadelphia. Unlike the aforementioned cooperative
efforts, this community was not government sponsored.
Bryn Gweled Homesteads is a community of approximately seventy
homesteads on 240 acres of rolling fields and woodlands in Lower Bucks
County, Pennsylvania. It had its beginning in 1939 when a dozen
families in Philadelphia came together to discuss the possibility of a
cooperative venture. This group contacted Ralph Borsodi at "The School
of Living" in Suffern, New York, and with his consultation, crystallized
the ideals they were reaching for, and the means of realizing those
ideals. Their primary purpose was to establish a true democracy, where
people could come together regardless of differences in racial and re-
ligious backgrounds, to work for the community as a whole in solving
problems, to the majority's satisfaction, and to share in recreation
facilities and leisure time activities with others of similar interests.
Some of the group had already had experience in various kinds of cooper-
atives, and they knew that by working together they could develop and
maintain facilities which they could not hope to manage alone.
In the spring of 1940, the group incorporated as Bryn Gweled
(Welsh for "Hill of Vision") Homesteads, designating 80 acres to be for
the use and pleasure of all members, held forever as common woodland,
the remaining land to be divided into building plots of one and one-half
to two acres.
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The membership of Bryn Gweled is composed of people of varied
cultural, religious, and racial backgrounds, in a wide range of ages and
occupations. In the original group, comprised mostly of professionals,
there were, among others, engineers, a physician, teachers, social workers,
architects, a minister, and an artist. The community belief in slow
growth is reflected in the procedure for admitting members. Prospective
homesteaders are invited to visit all of the families individually on
the Homestead and to become thoroughly acquainted with the community
and its way of life. They are asked to attend two Bryn Gweled meetings,
and are then visited by the Membership Committee. Because congeniality
and the sharing of ideas is vital to the success of the project, it is
important for applicants and members to get to know each other. At the
completion of these visits, questionnaires and reference letters are con-
sidered at a closed membership meeting. A four-fifths affirmative vote
of the resident members brings new members into the Homestead.
The original members lived a more communal life than the families
do now. They built their own roads, dug their own trenches for under-
ground utility wires so that there would be no service poles or wires
visible to destroy their views, and cooperatively built their houses,
with one of the architects or engineers advising on details if needed.
Communal landscaping and site planning was practiced, with one result
being that each plot has complete privacy from the next without artificial
fencing. A swimming pool was fashioned out of the remaining stone "base-
ment" of a collapsed Pennsylvania Dutch barn, and ball diamonds, soccer
fields, and tennis courts were also provided by the residents' efforts.
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Originally, the homesteaders raised their own vegetables, poultry and
pigs cooperatively, had steers butchered and shared the meat, and bought
staples in quantity and fruits from farmers by the bushel, sharing in
canning and preserving. They had sewing and window washing bees. As
the homes were paid for and the country went into its era of prosperity,
with increased incomes for the residents, there was less need to live so
economically. However, the cooperative effort still prevails in their
social existence, and a helping hand would be extended in any emergency,
be it financial or emotional.
Bryn Gweled is a cooperative nonprofit corporation owned by its
members. The land is capitalized at its value at the time of purchase
in 1940. There are no paid officers, managers, bookkeepers, maintenance
people, etc. All functions are performed gratis by members of the Home-
stead. Community business is conducted at a membership meeting held the
first Saturday evening of each month. The Board of Directors, the Pres-
ident, Vice-President, the Membership Committee and the Nominating Com-
mittee are elected by the membership. The Board of Directors appoints
the treasurer, secretary, and corresponding secretary. Everyone is ex-
pected to serve on at least one committee yearly, and members are
encouraged to take part in a variety of responsibilities over the years.
The list of volunteer committees is long and provides some insight
into the working of the Homestead: Property and Utilities, Children's
Activities, Swimming Pool, Soccer, Community Maintenance, Community
Activities, Grounds and Planting, Community News Sheet, and Tractor.
Regular work parties are held each month and enable the project to operate
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as economically as it does. There is also a communal, self-service
gas station owned by the Homesteads.
When a family joins Bryn Gweled, it leases a lot for a 99 year
renewable term. Monthly assessments of the Homestead cover such ex-
penses as maintenance of community property and improvements, taxes on
unleased lots and common land, community activities and other items.
Monthly assessments vary slightly, depending on the size, location,
and arability of the lot rather than on the imporvements. A capital in-
vestment of approximately $1,600 is required, to be paid at a minimum
rate of $10.00 per month. Wives as well as husbands are members, so that
there is equality of voice in management.
Each family builds or buys a home, and owns all such improvements,
but does not own the land. If a member secures a mortgage, Bryn Gweled
is asked to join in the mortgage, reserving the right to continue payment
in case of the individual's default, though assuming no liability to re-
pay the loan. Banks and Building and Loan Associations have accepted
mortgages on leased land under this arrangement. Bryn Gweled and its
members are assessed for taxes by the county and township as are any other
real estate and home owners.
When a family is ready to build, the Community Planning Committee
reviews the plans, offers its experience, and helps in explaining town-
ship and Bryn Gweled requirements concerning structures, well, septic
tank, tile drain field, and distances between the improvements and the
lot boundaries. Neighbors are consulted on the acceptability of major
features of plantings and structures. Within this framework a family
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develops its lot according to its individual wishes. If a family with-
draws from Bryn Gweled, the owner is responsible for the sale of the
house, which may be made only to another Bryn Gweled member family.
Occasionally houses are for rent, although the ideal of owner-occupied
homes is important for the full democratic participation of the community.
The ten original houses were designed by four architects and built
cooperatively or individually. There is little similarity in roof lines
or in specific proportions, but the individualistic quality of the design
and the appropriateness of materials create a bond more interesting and
significant than standardization could produce. The contemporary homes
at Bryn Gweled were created without any preconceived images--simply out
of the owner's requirements for living. The homesteaders are proud that
in many cases they had no clear idea of the house exterior before it was
built, the plan and the function furnishing the bases for discussions with
the architects.
Bryn Gweled was originally planned as a commuting community, with
most of the men working in either Philadelphia or Princeton, New Jersey. In
its March, 1946 issue, Progressive Architecture criticized this incon-
venience, in addition to the lack of cluster development in the homesteads,
saying that the inability to reach by foot essential facilities (stores,
an elementary school, a post office, church, or auditorium) prevents Bryn
Gweled from becoming a complete neighborhood. While one-acre lots may
have provided the desired privacy and also guaranteed a closer physical
relationship between the residents, the predominant desire of these
settlers, having come out of large apartment complexes in the city, was
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country living with space enough for not only gardening, but small scale
cooperative subsistence farming. Given a larger, government sponsored
public enterprise of this nature, without the specific requirements of
this group, more efficient use of space could be arranged, resulting in
a closer neighborhood unit.
One interesting point made in the Progressive Architecture article,
was that the Bryn Gweled method of homesteading does not make sufficient
savings possible to send the children to out-of-town colleges which is
almost imperative in a community of this location and type. In direct
contradiction to that statement, recent contact with the members of the
community has revealed that not only has their way of life proved success-
ful, but the combination of working jobs in the "outside world" while
cooperating on expenses at home has resulted in their children attending
some of the best schools in the country.
For the times in which they were built, Bryn Gweled houses display
a variety of structural innovations. In one house there are neither
radiators nor hot air vents, but imbedded in the floors are pipes of cir-
culating warm water that provide its heat. Another home has air conditioned
walls. The children's wing of another has movable partitions, so that,
by day, the separate sleeping rooms can be opened into one big playroom.
Several of the homes are built on one floor, with wide eaves that keep
out the sun in summer and let it in for warmth in winter, while some have
water-shingled roofs, each consisting of a tank which covers the house
with a four-inch sheet of circulating water that repels summer heat. In
winter the tank is drained and the black composition surface absorbs heat
from the sun's rays. One family was so fond of picnics, that they
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incorporated a second story sun deck into the design of their home, com-
plete with an outdoor fireplace. At night, double doors swing open and
beds roll out to convert this sun deck into a sleeping porch.
Instead of Borsodi's back to basics approach to kitchen ware and
lifestyle in general, the inhabitants of Bryn Gweled have equipped their
homes with convenient, labor saving appliances, but all are designed for
living—not streamlined out of all humanity, after the modern "functional"
houses designed at that time. Many of these devices pertain to not only
the canning, freezing, sewing, and other household chores, but the crafts
pursued by nearly all of the residents—weaving, ceramics, stained glass,
and others.
Bryn Gweled draws no religious or color line. Many of the original
families are Quakers (now numbering about twenty-five percent) and the
feeling throughout the community for racial and religious tolerance is
strong. On the questionnaire that candidates are asked to read and sign
it's stated:
There may be German, English, Italian, Chinese, Russian, Negro,
Jewish, Japanese, etc., members living on the Homesteads. Does
this meet with your approval for such things as eating with them,
swimming with them, and working with them cooperatively?
Any family that answers "no" automatically excludes itself. On the
other hand, individuality is cherished, and in the by-laws of the cor-
poration is an article:
The rights of members to absolute freedom of religion, politics,
association, expression, production and exchange shall never be
abridged or impaired by the group, except so far as the freedom
of individual members conflicts with the rights of other members.
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Another quotation which gives insight into the concerns of the Homesteaders
conies from their brochure called, The Gully Trail , which maps and describes
all the common woods and trails which wind through Bryn Gweled, and which
includes a complete inventory of all trees and shrubs on the entire prop-
erty:
We have seen how all nature works together harmoniously and con-
stantly for new creation. It is only by pausing to realize what
is happening that we can respect, enjoy, and love it, and help pre-
serve it for our children and their children's children.
This brochure not only contains botanical sketches of the leaves of each
of the trees, vines, wild flowers and shrubs, but tells which birds and
animals feed on or seek shelter from them, a truly valuable ecological
guide to both children and adults.
There has been and perhaps will always be talk about the home-
steaders. They have been accused of being almost everything (communists,
socialists) except what they really are--a group of people who have found
it possible to live together in a community and provide for themselves
and their children a feeling of belonging and security.
Conclusion
The organization of the Regional Planning Association of America
in 1923 signified a sharp break with traditional housing and planning
thought in the United States. Composed of a small number of talented
technicians and social critics, the R.P.A.A. was distinctive for its un-
compromising criticism of metropolitan centralization, small scale spec-
ulative housing development and planning efforts which failed to relate
physical and social change within a regional framework. As an alternative,
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the R.P.A.A. devised a community planning program based upon innovations
in residential design site planning and financing, and the development
of regional cities, comprised of a multiplicity of community types. The
members felt that both the large metropolitan areas as well as the smaller
regional communities would benefit from a more equal distribution of the
population.
The New Deal rural resettlement programs originally tried to in-
corporate an enhanced social vision as well as physical redevelopment
activities, but they failed in their basic objectives for relocating
depression-struck farmers and city dwellers into rural subsistence home-
steads. The government used the R.P.A.A. 's ideas selectively, but never
followed through on a national scale. The Greenbelt town program, out
of the Suburban Resettlement section of the R.A., for example, was too
small and too suburban to do justice to the R.P.A.A. 's regionalism. The
three towns that were finally buil t--Greenbel t, Greenhills, and Greendale--
exemplified the rising standards in community planning. Henry Wright,
Clarence Stein, Robert Kohn, and Catherine Bauer, all R.P.A.A. members,
made at least some direct contribution to the program's limited success.
The reasons for failure of the Resettlement Administration's pro-
grams were many and complex. The atmosphere in the new agency had become
a little heady. The aspirations could not have been more benevolent, and
much hard thought went into plans and programs. But somehow, the R.A.
insiders neglected to take the American people into their confidence.
The whole effort skipped too many basic attitudes. M. L. Wilson used to
talk about the "white-lighters, never satisfied, but excited," who could
laynot bear to be by themselves in rural solitude. The trouble
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basically in the fact that most Americans were white-lighters, from an
indivualistic and competitive culture, lacking any faith in the community
idea.
The New Deal also failed to establish a sufficiently appreciative
and supportive political constituency for its planning policies and pro-
grams among the electorate, the various pressure groups, Congress and
its powerful committees. It was, in fact, for such political reasons,
as well as for substantive and technical failures, that some of the New
Deal's main pieces of planning were ultimately embattled and finally
demolished.
The problem of economic opportunities plagued the whole New Deal
community program. The stranded communities were planned with a suf-
ficient economic base and suffered thereafter because of this lack,
while the suburban communities, and particularly the greenbelt cities,
were located near enough to industrial employment to eliminate any employ-
ment problems, but the low income families could not repay the govern-
ment for its investment in what turned out to be rather expensive housing.
They could afford to live in and maintain their new communities. The
industrial type subsistence homesteads, located between industry and agri-
culture, were ideally situated for economical living, but not unless the
subsistence plots were intensively utilized. This meant that the R.A.
must educate the homesteaders in gardening and home production. The all
rural communities, planned for full time agriculture, were really testing
grounds for American small farm agriculture, and most of these projects
from 1936 to 1941 did not provide a net profit, let alone permit any re-
payment to the government.
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For Tugwell, the Resettlement Administration was an assignment
about which he had mixed feelings. While he was very concerned about
the fate of the rural poor and wished to offer solutions to their
dilemma, in particular, he fundamentally disapproved of the whole sub-
sistence homestead approach. Tugwell felt that to go against technology
was to go against history—if the family farm or the subsistence home-
stead had a role, it was at best peripheral, exacting a far higher
economic cost than social value justified. While he was always willing
to humor Roosevelt by chat about the advantages of decentralization, he
did his best to deflate Roosevelt's belief that the land could absorb
the urban unemployed and to diminish the fantasy of a new rural-urban
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society. Nonetheless, the administrative inheritance of the Resettle-
ment Administration had a momentum of its own, both from the projects
to which it was already committed and from the personnel which it had
already attracted. Receiving nearly a hundred rural communities, in
process or in prospect, from Subsistence Homesteads and F.E.R.A., Tugwell
confronted the problem of giving them an economic basis which would save
them from decaying into rural slums. They had not attracted industry as
M. L. Wilson had hoped, and Congress had forbidden them publicly owned
factories. The remaining solution, in Tugwell 's view, was commercial
agriculture made possible through collective operation of the land, an
idea which failed to appeal to the citizens of the 1930's.
Tugwell was enthusiastic about the Greenbelt towns, and while he
would have liked more of them, the prohibitive costs of the three initial
experiments, among other problems, made this impossible. However, the
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greenbelt cities stand as monuments to Tugwell's ideas for social exper-
iments in cooperation, site planning, architecture, and community planning
on a human scale.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPANSION AND COOPERATION
Almost predictably the conditions the Regional Planning Associa-
tion of America deplored in the twenties worsened. By 1920, just half
of the nation's population lived in cities. By the same statistical
standard, the figure now approaches three-quarters of the population.
More important, a large proportion of these people live in the over-
extended metropolitan areas; most live in suburbs. Financiers still con-
trol urban development, although they now depend on federal complicity.
Slums abound, and the move away from the human scale takes increasingly
bizarre forms. The country weathered an urban crisis without any real
change in national attitudes toward the city, and environmental conditions
have seriously deteriorated.
After tracing the ideas of the RPAA, with particular emphasis on
its cooperative theories, the community planning program of the New Deal,
including the Subsistence Homesteads program and the Greenbelt towns under
Rexford Tugwell , and a currently operating cooperative community, Bryn
Gweled Homesteads, certain conclusions have been drawn, utilizing various
aspects of these philosophies and programs. In order to attain the
stated goal of decentralizing the population through expanding strateg-
ically placed small towns, the cooperative method of community planning,
complete with self-built cooperative housing endeavors, is a possible
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economic and social solution. As regional cities succeed in drawing
people away from the large urban centers, similar cooperative enter-
prises would be instituted in the inner cities, allowing established
ethnic groups to rehabilitate their neighborhoods, avoiding the usual
problem with lending institutions.
The federal government would initially subsidize the cooperative
building efforts, with the towns, or neighborhoods, gradually assuming
control. A national planning program would be implemented by the federal
government, with regional or state branches, to screen applications by
towns wishing to expand, and to consult with the local government as the
programs are undertaken. A reference for implementation possibilities
is England, where there has been considerable experience in both small
town expansion and decentralizing population.
Planned Expansion of Existing Towns
The growing imbalance in the distribution of population and indus-
try throughout the country is shown in the already congested areas
attracting large numbers of people and industries, while many of the
smaller country towns have declined both in population and relative im-
portance. Many of these smaller towns once held important roles in the
nation, being situated on railroad routes, close to major highways, or on
waterways. As the United States enters another era in growth, focussing
on the South and Southwest as its new target areas, with the northeastern
seaboard left in an economic slump, it appears that some form of planned
dispersal of industry and population is needed to secure a better dis-
tribution throughout the country.
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The majority of the smaller country towns which were not suitably
sited to perform commuter functions have suffered a decline in both
population and general prosperity during the present century. In order
that some of the more viable among them may remain and continue to thrive
as economic entities, some grafting onto them of additional population
and industry is essential. In this way their servicing functions will
also be increased and they will be able to survive as useful regional
sub-centers, supplying the needs of extensive surrounding rural areas as
well as amply satisfying the requirements of their own inhabitants. Many
of the towns possess considerable character and charm and although some
of this will probably be lost in the further development and expansion
process, nevertheless much of their beauty and outstanding features can
still be preserved by careful planning and integration of the new develop-
ment with the old.
In order that country towns can expand to any significant extent,
planning on a national level concerning dispersal of population and in-
dustry from over populated and badly congested large urban centers is
necessary. There is a real need for a large measure of planned long-range
dispersal, as opposed to spontaneous peripheral dispersal. Living,
traveling and working conditions in the very large cities have many de-
ficiencies - cramped housing and working conditions exist for many people,
accompanied by intense traffic congestion and long time-wasting and tiring
journeys. As the large city continues to sprawl, the open countryside
becomes more inaccessible to many of its residents. Furthermore, it is
becoming exceedingly difficult to find new sites in large centers of
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population for rehousing people from slums and for carrying out urgent
and vital redevelopment proposals, such as the provision of new housing,
schools, open spaces and road improvements, unless large numbers of
people and many industries leave the large cities.
There are many considerations and obstacles to overcome in the
formulation and execution of this proposed program of town expansion.
First, it is important that each town to be expanded is in a suitable
location with good lines of communication, and that the necessary work
required for redevelopment can be done at a reasonable cost. Mutual
agreement of all the participating parties (local government, residents,
planners, etc.) is essential as no compulsory action would work, and
maximum cooperation and good will is needed at all stages in order to
succeed. In addition, it is frequently difficult to try to persuade in-
dustrialists to move to a small expanding town, and once established,
attracting sufficient numbers of workers often becomes a major problem.
The local government must receive adequate financial resources to under-
take the extensive and costly job of town expansion without a burden
falling on the local taxes. Satisfactory integration of old and new
residents can be far from easy, and should be approached with care and
forethought. Great emphasis should be placed on requiring the skills of
the planners to prevent the destruction of the character and charm of the
small towns undergoing expansion programs.
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English Experience with Town Expansion
In England in 1940, the reoort of the Royal Commission on the Dis-
tribution of the Industrial Population was presented to Parliament. This
is usually referred to as the 'Barlow Report' after the chairman of the
commission, Sir Montague Barlow. The report recommended the setting up
of a central authority, national both in scope and character, to control
the redevelopment of congested urban areas, the decentralization or dis-
persal, both of industries and industrial population from these areas,
and to encourage a reasonable balance of industrial development through-
out Great Britain, coupled with appropriate diversification of industry
throughout each region of the country. It was considered that the con-
tinued drift of the industrial population to London constituted a social,
economic and strategic problem, which demanded immediate attention. The
Central Authority have power to refuse consent to the establishment of
additional industrial development in London or the Home Counties, except
where it could be shown that the proposed undertaking could not be con-
ducted on an economic basis elsewhere.
Following the Barlow Report, the Distribution of Industry Act pro-
vided for the first time some government control over the geographical
siting of new industries. The government department responsible for
securing a balance in the distribution of industry in England is the
Board of Trade. Distressed or 'development areas' are developed with
government aid with modern factories and a good variety of industries.
Development (or expansion) areas also have priority in the Board of Trade's
direction of industry. An industrialist wishing to construct a factory
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with a floor area in excess of 5,000 square feet has to obtain an indus-
trial development certificate from the Board of Trade before he can apply
for planning permission. The Control of Office and Industrial Develop-
ment Act of 1965 has extended the control of new factories down to floor
areas of 1,000 square feet in certain areas (primarily London, southeast
England and the Midlands) and introduced control of new office buildings
in excess of 3,000 square feet in certain areas (as in the metropolitan
region).
To implement a town expansion program, manufacturers must be found
who are prepared to build or rent factories in expanding towns. Often,
the new towns could be attractive to industrialists imaginative enough
to refurbish older existing factory buildings, thereby saving money in
both initial outlay compared to building new establishments, and in lower
taxes. Some industries are compelled to move because the sites they
occupy in the city are needed for other purposes, such as housing, schools,
road improvements, etc. Others either can't afford the high taxes of the
urban area, or wish to expand, are unable to do so on their present sites,
and can thus benefit from a move to an expanding town.
Most towns tend to grow by a process of natural increase spread
over a long period, possibly 50 to 100 years. The development in an ex-
panding town would be condensed into a much shorter period, probably 10
to 15 years, and this requires skillful planning to secure smooth integra-
tion of old and new. Careful planning and coordination is also required
to ensure that the various essential services and buildings are provided
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in advance of requirements, but not prematurely, for financial reasons.
There is a danger in some cases that unless a carefully considered plan
for expansion is prepared, undesirable developments may take place, such
as is happening in the Southeast and Southwest. Given the proper lead
time, towns scheduled for expansion can develop in the manner that they
themselves desire, and opportunities will be provided to develop the
best kind of communities in accordance with the concepts of best planning
practice.
Apart from the economic risk resulting from dependence on a single
main industry, there is often an associated social imbalance and a need
for only one class of work or one-sex labor. Mining towns have in the
past been notorious for their lack of opportunities for female employment
and the consequent emigration of young women in search of work. There-
fore, many small towns previously dependent upon one industry would be
enthusiastic about an exoansion program which would help balance their
employment possibilities. Expansion programs offer a real chance to
small towns of recovering lost industry and simultaneously bringing in
a stream of young and able-bodied citizens. With the increase in popula-
tion comes the economic diversification, the fuller range of social activ-
ities and the increased local income that this brings with it. In addition,
a town which may not be large enough to maintain adequate playing fields,
a swimming pool and other amenities, could do so with a larger population.
If the scale of expansion is reasonable, then, unlike new towns,
the investment in public services, in social facilities such as schools
hospitals, and in shops and offices per factory space is likely to be
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much less. It would also spread the additional industrial and domestic
traffic load onto less used and more cheaply improved roads of the rural
areas to the relief of the freeways around the cities. Additionally,
the towns would achieve a sense of well being that comes from expanding
economic opportunity—the stimulus that leads to more enthusiasm in local
government and in community enterprise, and indeed to renewal.
Some of the more important matters considered when examining a
potential expanding town site include such aspects as:
1. Relative ease and cost of provision of basic services, such
as water supply, sewerage, sewage disposal and electricity.
2. Similar considerations with the provision of major social
services such as schools, shopping, health services, etc.
3. Suitability of sites for development and estimated cost of
development.
4. Comparative agricultural value of land.
5. General weakness or strength of the town as a center.
6. History of population movement in the town and surrounding
countryside and changes in its structure.
7. Probable attractiveness of the town to industry.
A brief list of how to go about setting up the expansion program
for an existing small town might include the following:
1. Joint exploration by both local government and the Federal
government before anyone is committed.
2. Development shall only take place in areas zoned by the local
planning authority for housing and industry.
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3. Avoidance of good agricultural land wherever possible.
4. Amount and rate of expansion shall be that which the local
government (and its citizens) consider desirable. They are asked to
agree to expansion at a rate which they can, without undue disturbance,
absorb the new population and industry.
5. No family will leave an urban area for an expanding town un-
less a job is already there or will be provided by the transfer of a
business.
6. As expansion proceeds, the local housing needs will be
satisfied at the same time. An effort would be made to mix the existing
and new population to avoid the segregation of newcomers.
7. There shall be a standing consulting and advisory committee
of the local and federal government during the period of expansion.
The support of the majority of local residents is essential if
town expansion ideas are to operate smoothly. In this connection, it
is important that the local government takes all possible steps to keep
the public fully informed and to secure their confidence, approval, and
support. A public meeting should be held to enable local people to
examine the proposals at the earliest possible stage, giving them the
opportunity to make informal observations on the draft proposals. The
joint committee mentioned in item 7 above, comprised of reDresentatives
of a national planning agency and representatives of the local government,
would be charged with submitting for approval:
I. A 'master plan' covering such matters as:
1. uses to be made of land
2. zoning proposals
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3. densities of development
4. road patterns
5. siting of public utilities, buildings, and amenities.
II. An annual program of operations and an annual estimate of
expenditure.
III. A Capital Improvements Program.
A minimum size limit should be established for towns before any
grafting of additional population and industry can take place. One of
the main advantages claimed for town development procedure is the
existence of a nucleus around which the new development can be established.
This nucleus contains the main shops, banks, entertainment facilities,
municipal offices, schools, cultural activities, etc., which are available
to the first of the new residents. With towns having populations below
6,000 to 7,000 these facilities are normally limited in both scope and
content but they do vary with the rural service area attached to the town.
From his investigation of expanding towns, Ivor H. Seeley" suggests that
a town of 15,000 to 30,000 population would offer a far better basis for
an expansion program than a town of about 5,000 persons, and could absorb
satisfactorily a much larger addition of population. However, even a
town of 5,000 population has advantages over a virgin site for a new town
in that it does provide some form of social nucleus.
The concept of an expanding town should be to gradually build on
the foundation of an existing community in such a way and at such a speed
that at each stage of growth the expanding community is a balanced and
integrated community. The scale and pace at which this can be done is
necessarily governed by the capacity of the original community to absorb
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expansion. The speed of expansion should be based on sociological con-
siderations rather than considerations of expediency or convenience.
Successful integration of old and new residents is more likely to be
achieved with a slower rate of growth.
One of the most binding influences in uniting a community of old
and new residents would be the establishment of as many cooperative sys-
tems as possible. This would give some of the older residents an important
position as sources of information on location ard availability of con-
sumer goods, building materials for cooperative house building, as well
as allow some of the new residents to share their skills in such endeavors
as cooperative nursery schools, crafts instruction, etc. If the expanded
housing program could be patterned after the system at Greenbelt, set up
by the New Deal, as opposed to the privately developed new towns of the
recent past which have had constant economic problems, then people of all
income brackets could, in fact, build a town, sharing their skills and
knowledge.
The problem of the exploding metropolis has been tackled in various
ways— through urban renewal, which now has its own literature of failure,
through privately sponsored new towns, which suffer from economic problems
as well as fail to serve the needs of a cross section of the population,
and through public housing, for the most part a source of shame as a
demonstration project in depersonalization and alienation. Pruitt-Igoe
is an overused example of the failure of Dublic housing, but a more pos-
itive and hopeful example is the public housing facility in the Bronx
whose residents, exasperated with the intolerable conditions and non-
existent management which seems to accompany government housing projects,
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demanded control of the facility. When they gained control, they pro-
ceeded to meet, set up committees, and in a short time had the project
running on little money, but on a purely cooperative basis, collecting
their own rents and keeping their own books in a far more efficient, and
more important, more humane atmosphere.
The detailed formulation and implementation of the expansion pro-
gram could advantageously be undertaken on a regional basis. In this
way positive regional plans could link groups of expanding towns to either
a major expansion or a larger established town to form a regional city
cluster which could provide services at a regional level, such as spe-
cialized shopping, higher educational establishment, airport, hospital
services, theatres and other cultural activities. Development of this
sort woulc need a comprehensive regional road network linked to national
traffic routes and good rail systems.
In this way genuine counter-magnets to metropolitan areas could
be established, existing communities revitalized, dispersal of services
and industry would be encouraged and, where suitably located, it would be
possible to link the clusters of towns to existing ports. The town clus-
ter formation should foster economies in administration and execution of
schemes.
The federal government must assert a specific interest in the
movement of people, displaced by technology or driven by poverty, from
rural to urban areas, and also in the movement from densely populated
central cities to suburban areas. Much of the present urban crisis
derives from the almost total absence of any provision for an orderly
movement of persons from the countryside into the city. The federal
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government made extraordinarily successful efforts to provide for the
resettlement of Hungarian refugees in the 1950's and Cuban refugees in
the 1960" s, but almost nothing has been done for Americans driven from
their homes by forces equally severe.
Rural to urban migration has not stopped, and will not for some
time. Doubtless the United States will remain a nation of exceptionally
mobile persons, but the completely unassisted processes of the Dast need
not continue with respect to the migration of impoverished rural popula-
tions. Knowing the potential millions of persons to be added to the
U.S. population in the next few years, it is folly to have no policy with
respect to where they will be located. To let nature take its course is
a policy. To consider what might be best for all concerned and to seek
to provide it is surely a more acceptable goal.
Housing Cooperatives
Non-profit continuing cooperatives offer a Dossibility for inno-
vative housing. They combine proprietary rights with the concept of
non-profit, they put residents (members) in the position of both landlord
and tenant, they create non-market housing that is privately owned, they
encourage future occupants of multiple housing to have a hand in planning
their accommodation, and they provide for a broad mix of incomes in a
society accustomed to thinking that housing must be arranged by income
groupings.
This form of housing is a thoroughly logical answer to many of the
tremendous housing problems of modern society. Pressure on land will
eventually force us into various forms of multiple housing and reduce the
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number of single detached houses to a much smaller proportion. At the
same time, citizens in modern society are demanding more and more control
over their own affairs, including housing.
The concept, however, is not readily grasped if thought of in
traditional ways. In a capitalistic society, we are accustomed to think-
ing of all business and essential services as being divided among inves-
tors, management and consumers—that is, those who own, those who control
and those who use. Cooperatives are the very antithesis of this, for
they are enterprises in which owners, those who control and those who use,
are all the same people—this is essentially an integrated system.
The cooperative approach tries to bring about some sort of balance
between producers and consumers in a market where the producers have long
held sway. The producers on the one hand are builders, developers, land-
lords, mortgage lenders, planners, professionals, suppliers, and real
estate companies who have, traditionally, been in complete control. Con-
sumers on the other hand are home buyers, tenants, mortgagors, borrowers,
purchasers and users of the end product, and their bargaining strength
has generally been weak--they haven't written many of the rules and con-
ditions. A cooperative puts them in a position to do so, or at least
bargain from the strength of a group. If the strength of the average
citizen has been weak in the housing market, the poor have had no bar-
gaining power at all. Their only leverage has been pity or charity, un-
certain and shifting in the matter of housing.
The non-profit housing cooperative is such a new concept that it
is sometimes not well understood by seasoned cooperative members accustomed
to other facets of the cooperative idea, such as credit unions and consumer
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cooperatives. In these, membership may be casual, but in a housing coop-
erative, one's membership is firm and continuous. A further important
point of difference from most other cooperatives is the participation of
government and various public authorities in cooperative housing. Coop-
eratives generally have prided themselves on self-reliance and independence
from government—whatever strength they generated came from within. But
housing is a different kind of enterprise, usually calling for a great
deal of assistance or concurrence from various levels of government.
This is especially true of housing that provides accommodation for people
of low income.
Finally, the very concept of non-profit is different for housing.
In a conventional consumer's cooperative, the aim is service at cost-
whatever profit accrues to the cooperative belongs to the members. But
in a housing cooperative operated on a non-profit basis, any advantage in
costs must be taken in the form of reduced monthly charges. If and when
circumstances require the disposal of the assets of the cooperative, they
cannot be distributed among the members currently living in the project
so as to yield a personal gain to anyone. Non-profit in continuing coop-
eratives goes all the way, and can also be called non-market housing.
The individual homeowner has a dual relationship to his house—it is both
shelter and investment. But in a non-profit continuing cooperative, the
ownership is collective and is for shelter, or use, only. A member
occupies a particular unit as his home, but when he leaves he cannot sell
it because he has it under leasehold. As long as he remains, he pays only
for the use of housing. On departure he takes only the cash contribution
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he made to capital, plus the cost of changes or improvements in the unit
approved by the cooperative's board of directors.
The concepts inherent to non-profit housing cooperatives are, to
many people, quite radical. As a consequence, sound cooperatives are not
going to spring up everywhere overnight--they are going to take time and
the process may be slow until a firm foundation is laid.
Proof that cooperatives can be developed to form a major sector
of housing is provided by four Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Norway,
Sweden, and Finland, which together have built over 1.4 million units of
cooperative housing to date. In 1972, cooperatives accounted for 80,000
new units, or 30 percent of all housing in the four countries. In Poland,
the proportion of cooperative units to total housing production is much
higher and, the percentage of state housing to all new housing has fallen
while the percentage of cooperatives has risen dramatically.
It is not merely living in the same general area that makes a num-
ber of people a community. Two or three hundred families in a private
rental highrise building who hardly know one another cannot be called a
community. A typical suburb can often be a collection of isolated
families and individuals who just happen to be occupying houses in the
same geographical area, in the planning of which they had no hand and
shared no ideas, and have little to say about its control and management.
In a private rental project, the landlord makes the rules and tenants
usually have little to say about creating their own housing environment,
while in public housing, a government agency is in control and only
recently have tenants been encouraged to organize and have a voice in
influencing management. The basic concept emerging from these observations
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is that community is something more than a certain geographical area.
It is people who are conscious of having broad control over deciding their
own living environment and life style, and deciding that they have to and
want to take responsibility for shaping a certain kind of neighborhood
for themselves and their children. It is people having a deep sense of
interdependence, of concern for one another, of commitment to sharing many
things together.
It is fundamental that people who are going to live in a cooperative
project must be involved as consumers in planning it, whether it is going
to be new construction or renovated existing housing. There must be a
preparatory period during which the membership is built before the build-
ing begins. If mistakes are going to be made, it is better that those
who will have to live with them, perhaps for a long time, have also had
a hand in making them. To objections raised about the participation of
members at an early stage, saying that it slows down the planning process,
the Canadian experiences indicate that it will not cause any slowdown or
delay if there is a good technical resources group and an experienced
coordinator.
A preparatory educational program gives the future members of the
cooperative an opportunity to assess and select their own leadership
team and elect a competent board of directors. This sifting out of cap-
abilities and personalities at an early stage gives the members time to
select good directors. It is often the board of directors that makes the
difference between success and failure in any cooperative enterprise.
The question of size is important from the viewpoint of community.
The objective should be to strike a balance between a project that is too
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small for diversity of interests and one that is too large for people to
get together easily. Projects with fewer than 50 units may have difficulty
organizing such an important community service as a daycare center, while
one over 200 units may tend to be too impersonal and subject to policies
set by management.
Housing by People
In the same cooperative vein as housing planned by the residents,
and expanded towns organized by uniting old and new residents with coop-
eratives of all sorts, the actual building of the housing can be done more
efficiently and with greater personal satisfaction if the method of con-
struction is cooperative and undertaken by the residents themselves. To
point out the material diseconomies, social dysfunctions, and general
counter-productivity of centrally administered governmental housing supply
systems, does not mean that government has no role. A radical change of
relations is needed between people and government in which government
ceases to persist in doing what it does badly or uneconomically--building
and managing houses--and concentrates on what it has the authority to do—
to ensure equitable access to resources which local communities and people
cannot provide for themselves. To fight instead for the restoration or
extension of public expenditure on conventional housing programs is as
reactionary as the failure to press for land reform and the liberation of
housing finance from corporate banking.
Interestingly enough, the relatively well off U.S. owner-builders
(along with the self-help rehabilitators and cooperative tenant-managers)
teach the same basic lessons as the far poorer squatters of Peru and most
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other so-called developing countries. Because housing decisions are con-
trolled by households themselves, or by local associations and enterprises,
they generate a great deal of wealth in proportion to their income. Not
only do those housed through locally self-governing systems have higher
standard homes than those provided by unsubsidized, centrally administered
systems, but they have far healthier social environments than their heter-
onomous* substitutes, whether subsidized or not. The evidence of cases
like Pruitt-Igo and Co-op City shows how much material waste and human
alienation can be produced by centrally administered systems. Instead
of generating wealth, heteronomy often produces poverty even among those
it supplies. By suppressing local organizations, local enterprises, and
personal and community initiative, it proves itself counter-productive.
The central proposition of Freedom To Build is that, for a viable
housing process to exist, local and personal control is essential. This
proposition was formulated after the discovery that the material savings
and human benefits of owner building, rehabilitation, and improvement in
the United States could be traced to dense local communication and supply
networks open to local residents. As long as building plots or vacant
buildings were available at reasonable prices and not inflated by specula-
tion or monopolistic aggregation, as long as there was a plentiful supply
of appropriate tools and materials through local distributors who did not
discriminate against small or non-professional purchasers, and as long
as local banks gave credit and were not absorbed into impersonally admin-
istered national corporations, then individual households and small groups
could maximize the use of their own resources. Learning from experience
146
and making do with what is at hand obviously depend on personal communica-
tion. No one person has to know many others very well, as long as there
are plenty of connections between various sets of friends.
The simultaneous satisfaction of the universal need for physical
shelter, the cultural need for belonging to a particular society and the
highly differentiated and personal need for self expression gives housing
its special meaning when done at the level of personal and community
action. Although there may be no analytical way to prove it, it seems
obvious that both economy and conviviality can come about only through
personal responsibility.
The basic lessons to be drawn from contemporary housing experience
in the United States are no different from those in the rest of the world.
Even if big housing developments do not look hideous to everyone, they
are hideously expensive and usually socially destructive. Whether in
the United States or elsewhere, both material and human viability evidently
demand a small scale, social and physical diversity, and variety. It is
becoming clearer that this can only be provided, and sustained, by large
numbers of responsibly self-governing persons, cooperating groups, and
small local enterprises. This is not meant to imply that the poor should
take over from the government. In our world, resources are in the control
of governmental or propertied elites, and there should be instead local
control dependent on personal and local access to resources which only
central government can guarantee.
In the years since 1973 when John F. C. Turner returned to his
native country, there has been a rapid change in the way in which housing
issues are perceived in Britain, a change which has even penetrated
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governmental thinking. A demand has arisen, not just for the consultation
of tenants, but for tenant control, for the transfer of both publicly and
privately rented housing to tenants' cooperatives, for dweller controlled
rehabilitation, for self-build housing associations, for widening the
range of options open to people. Turner has been in the midst of a net-
work of activists in all these fields, just as he is the British link
with a worldwide network of advocates of alternatives in housing. Re-
cently, in response to more perceptive analyses of the social psychology
of alienation, as well as to direct pressures from local groups of angry
voters, citizen participation has even been built into planning and build-
ing law, as in Britain, or as a prerequisite for federal support, as in
the United States, but participation also costs more when it has to be
built into central agencies' programs.
Forecasts of housing demands almost always fail. This occurs
mainly because it is wrongly supposed that people will spend a given pro-
portion of income on housing. Calculations of what people will spend are
based upon what bank or government agency officials assume people can
invest. But close observations in North and South America and in-depth
studies in Central America suggest that apparent coincidences of what
people will spend and what they can spend are superficial. If a family
or household has to spend nearly all its cash income on food in order to
keep alive, the proportion it can spend on housing is negligible—or even
negative after feeding and clothing, and paying for the breadwinner's
journey to work. So, they squat, or double up with relatives. And to
suppose, as many agencies and statisticians do, that any family can spend
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up to a quarter, or even a third, of its income on housing, is dangerously
wrong in such cases.
Unfortunately, most overly simple observations emphasize the need
for physical flexibility within dwellings or of dwellings. This has led
to a great deal of investment in expensive construction systems that allow
for internal rearrangements and the expansion and contraction of individ-
ual units—a mechanical view of 'loose-fit'. This investment has proved
both expensive and of only marginal benefit. It has done very little in
the way of providing for the vital needs of the great majority of peoDle.
Their requirements are not measured only by arrangement of rooms and
windows, but by the degree of accessibility that they have to their friends
and relatives, to their sources of income and to the places where they
spend it—all of which demand 'loose fit'. Large-scale systems have
created some of the most segregated cities the world has known.
Gordon's low energy characteristic of viable building is receiving
a great deal of current attention. Not only does the relatively short
life of large scale, centrally administered modern housing accelerate the
exhaustion of scarce resources, but it uses vastly more. Indigenous
buildings can offer enormous energy savings over conventional modern
buildings.
For large organizations to provide adequate housing, they must
standardize procedures and products in order to operate economically.
By necessity this conflicts with the local and personal variety of housing
priorities which are so important to successful housing programs. The
larger the organization and the more centralized management becomes, the
more frequent and greater the mismatches between people's housing
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priorities and the housing they get. As the mismatches increase, so does
the users' dissatisfaction. As a result, their investment of local and
personal resources decreases and other resources must be found as sub-
stitutes. These are generally heavy equipment and complex technologies
suitable for centralized organization, which only reinforces the cycle.
As these demand large amounts of scarce and increasingly expensive re-
sources, such as fossil fuel technologies and highly paid bureaucracies,
financial inflation is inevitable. Any further streamlining of centrally
administered housing systems to reduce costs only aggravates the cycle
where only the very wealthy or a heavily subsidized minority can expect
to be adequately housed.
In a democratic and genuinely socialist context, planning and
administration are legislative processes limited to establishing and
maintaining an equitable distribution of resources. For centrally admin-
istered societies, the amount of information needed for such distribution
is extremely complex, but in the case of non-authoritarian societies, the
information needed is quite different and far simpler. All that the
latter's central planners need to know is the demand for resources and
large scale infrastructure (public utilities and community facilities)
which cannot be provided at local levels. Instead of needing to know how
many houses are or will be demanded in a given place and tine or for a
given social sector the planners and administrators need only know the
approximate quantities of building materials, tools and labor, land and
credit that will be required. The local forms of these elements can be
left to the people and the local businesses that serve them. According
to Turner, the bureaucratic heteronomous system produces things of a high
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standard, at great cost, and of dubious use value, while the autonomous
system produces things of extremely varied standard, but at low cost,
and of high use value. In the long run, the productivity of centrally
administered systems diminishes as it consumes capital resource while
the productivity of locally self governing systems increases as it
generates capital through the investment of income. Big, far from
being better, is not only more expensive and more wasteful of resources,
but also increases the mismatches between the provision of, and people's
variable demands for housing. On"y people and local organization
—
localized housing systems—can provide the necessary variety in housing
and the great range of production techniques needed to build it.
For a cooperative group to build their own housing, they must have
appropriate technologies that allow them to use their own personal re-
sources. Hand tools, small powered tools, easily and cheaply transported
materials and locally available skills and labor are the common stock-in-
trade of local builders. Large firms tend to use large machines and
heavy technologies to reduce the highly variable human and local contri-
butions which complicate central administration and reduce its produc-
tivity. Traditional local and human technologies are too expensive for
a large organization. As a consequence, central administrations have far
less access to loose-fit low energy and long life technologies than
locally self-governing systems. The usual differences of cost between
heteronomous and autonomous housing, when both have equal access to their
preferred resources, is inevitably at least double in the first instance
and, in the long run, many more times than that.
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The larger the organization that builds and manages housing, the
tighter the fit, the greater the mismatch of housing and households, the
lower the effective demand. The higher the energy required and the
greater the capital costs, the shorter the lives of the buildings and
the greater the costs in use. The issue of housing economy is very
simple and straightforward: it can be a function of the Droductivity
of large organizations or it can be a matter of resourcefulness, whatever
the scale or kind of organization. If the former continues to be pre-
ferred by the majority of administrators, planners, legislators, and
architects, then concern will be concentrated on improving the efficiency
and productivity of large scale industry. But if economy could be con-
sidered a matter of resourcefulness, or the efficient use of available
resources, then the 'efficiency' of large organizations is evidently
counterproductive.
It is what housing does for people that matters more than what it
is, or how it looks. And therefore it is illogical to state housing
problems in the modern convention of 'deficits' of units to some material
standard. It is just this illogical basis used by centralized housing
systems for assessing housing needs that leads to the fictitious demands
on which nearly all housing policies are based. To be meaningful and
useful as a means of action, people's housing needs must always be stated
in terms of priorities. Three universal housing needs are: access to
the people, institutions and amenities on which a tenant's livelihood
depends, shelter from climate and neighbors, and tenure long enough to
make a move worthwhile.
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Conclusion
The one undebatable strategy that is needed now is somehow to
equalize opportunity and to redistribute resources and the good things
of life to the end that we may have a genuine regional equalization and
balance of people instead of the powerful conflict of people in nationa-
listic and economic competition. The answers to these situations will
be found in a major strategy which provides opportunity for each region
to produce wealth and use it wisely within its own domain, yet at the
same time provides ample opportunity through technology and communica-
tion for the movement of people and resources to and from the region with
opportunity for achievement outside as well as inside the region. The
assumptions of balance include a great deal more than the technically
defined balanced economy with its balanced agriculture and industry.
The heart of regional balance is found in the search for equal opportunity
for all the people through the conservation, development, and use of their
resources in the places where they live, adjusted to the interregional
culture and economy of the other regions of the nation. The goal, there-
fore, is one of balanced culture as well as economy, in which there is
equality of opportunity in education, in public health, in job opportun-
ities, and in the elimination of handicapping differentials between
different groups by involving them in a cooperative effort. These are
the very ideals of the Regional Planning Association of America, and later
the New Deal's Resettlement Administration under Rexford Guy Tugwell.
For reasons of politics and economy as well as war and American individu-
ality, these early advances toward a redistribution of the population,
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respect for nature and natural resources, and efforts to establish a
strong cooperative system of existence, did not fare as well as may have
been hoped. However, there Ere still vestiges of those early efforts,
prime examples of which are Greenbelt, Maryland and the Borsodi-inspired
Bryn Gweled. These are good subjects for the study of cooperative
success and failure, but the regional development through expansion of
strategically placed small towns has yet to be implemented. The Sub-
sistence Homesteads attempt and the later Resettlement Administration
program produced no true viable network of settlements or towns, so the
work needs to start afresh.
In American society, it is not so much a question of centraliza-
tion of authority in conflict with states' rights as it is a problem of
developing an adequate federalized central authority capable of achieving
realistic decentralization. In other words, it is necessary to have
some sort of national order of organization before the regions can be
integrated and before they can be cooperatively developed at their best.
There must be strong national character and organization before the
nation can be made strong through the integration of its diverse regions
so that regionalism may supplant the separatism and isolationism of our
sectional development. The point of emphasis here is that it is through
cooperative arrangement and the integration of diversified groups of
people, both economically and ethnically, that strength and stability
are to be found.
Such a functional regionalism becomes a tool for attaining balance
and equilibrium between people and resources, men and machines, the
state and the people. It is a tool of the democratic process in that it
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provides for the redistribution of the good things of life and of the
opportunity to work within the framework of different geographical areas
and their inherent cultural equipment. It can be a tool for democratic
world reconstruction, because it is through cooperative regionalism
rather than economic nationalism that the society of the future can be
organized for human welfare instead of for military achievements. It is
a tool for social planning, because it takes into consideration the
rights, privileges, and resources of people and areas and stresses self-
government and self-development as opposed to coercive centralized
power, and also because it offers specific technical workable ways of
developing and conserving resources for human use ends.
When decentralization serves as a device primarily for effective
administration it often strengthens the hand of centralization. It must
be clear that the mere establishment of regional centers of what are
primarily administrative districts does not constitute regionalism.
An example of this fallacy is the case of the National Resources Planning
Board in the New Deal era. This was an arrangement contrary to the
earlier recommendations of the committee Report on "Regional Factors in
National Planning and Development" where nine cities were designated as
field offices directed by personnel from the central office. The regions
were without boundaries or specific service objectives, the cities had
no prime purpose of serving their regions and no physical relation to
their economic or political constituency. Thus, vast areas were left as
Q
hinterland, or no man's land. The previous year's Report contained
an equally fallacious method of administrative regionalism. The proposed
federal organization of national planning through the administrative
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units of a total system of river valleys, would make possible an almost
completely centralized control of resources and economic process in
contradiction to such a balanced and regionally related program as the
9
TVA.
The promise of regionalism must depend largely not only upon
the previously stated definitions and conceptualizations but upon their
acceptance. Both because such definitions and conceptualization have
not been accomplished and because most scholars and planners a-e afraid
to venture too far out, scepticism and opposition are logical oroducts.
A part of this fear is based upon the thought that the conceptualization
called for is too complex and involves too much interdisciplinary co-
operation. That is, of course, exactly what is intended, and yet it
does demand more than most planners, social scientists or politicians
are willing to underwrite. The conclusion at this time must be conserv-
ative on any very large immediate promise of regionalism, exceot in the
gradual evolutionary process and in the logical developments made necessary
by the changing structure and crises of our civilization.
The nation remains committed to the same metropolitan ideal pursued
decades ago. The years since the New Deal bear out the RPAA's predictions
of crime and congestion, urban fiscal crisis, and wasteful suburban
sprawl. These are the still crumbling ruins of our metropolitan emphasis,
and the great task outlined by the RPAA and aspects of the New Deal com-
munity program still confronts us. Any effort to resolve the problems
of metropolitanism while maintaining its present economic and political
foundation, will only deepen the original crisis. The situation, in
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short, cannot be ameliorated without embarking on a bold new course.
Despite all of the political obstacles to change and the ideological
momentum to keep things as they are, there must be a fundamental com-
mitment. Instead of working pragmatically on meaningless civic improve-
ment projects, there must be a dedication to a new social order where
people have decent homes, a stable community life, a healthy and varied
environment, and a genuinely urban culture. That is the ultimate
challenge to be found in a program of gradual change from mutual
struggle to mutual support.
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ABSTRACT
After tracing the ideas of the Regional Planning Association of
America, a loosely organized group of technicians and planners active in
the 1920" s, as well as the community planning programs of the New Deal
in the 1930' s, the thesis proposes utilizing various aspects of these
programs today. In particular it emphasizes the merits of decentralizing
the population through expanding strategically placed small towns, in
order to create population magnets counter to those of the large metro-
politan areas.
Rexford G. Tugwell's position in the New Deal as advisor to Pres-
ident Roosevelt and head of the Resettlement Administration, receives
special attention. Tugwell played a pivotal role between the back-to-
the-earth philosophy of the Regional Planning Association of America and
the developing technocratic ideas of the future, and his performance in
the government's national planning program reflects that combination. He
was in charge of the Subsistence Homesteads Program, but was primarily
known for his favorite project, the Greenbelt towns - Greenbelt, Maryland,
Greenhills. Ohio, and Greendale, Wisconsin.
The cooperative method of community planning, complete with self-
built cooperative housing endeavors, is studied as a possible economic
solution to the expansion of small towns into a regional system. The
cooperative theories of the RPAA, the Subsistence Homesteads program, and
the Greenbelt towns are traced, and a currently operating cooperative
1
community, Bryn Gweled Homesteads, near Philadelphia, is featured. This
community was established in the late New Deal era through consultations
with Ralph Borsodi, a noted organizer of self-sufficient settlements,
and it has flourished over the years. The life style and success of Bryn
Gweled are documented through personal interviews and observations.
Finally, a proposal for a solution to today's problems concerning
national population imbalance due to the attraction of the metropolitan
areas draws upon the ideas of the RPAA and the Greenbelt towns. Although
these programs were never implemented with any real degree of success,
the economic and political climate was not favorable at the time. The
thesis asserts that the time is now favorable, both economically and polit-
ically, for expansion of towns in a regional matrix, using a cooperative
economic and social structure. A national planning program would be im-
plemented by the federal government, with regional or state branches, to
screen applications by strategically placed towns wishing to expand. These
regionally expanded cities would be clustered for mutually shared ameni-
ties, such as universities, symphony orchestras, and large medical centers,
obviating the necessity for each city to provide its own. The federal
government would initially subsidize the cooperative building efforts,
with the towns gradually assuming control.
As regional cities succeed in drawing people away from the large
urban centers, similar cooperative enterprises would be instituted in
the inner cities, allowing the established ethnic groups to self-build
and rehabilitate their own dwellings, avoiding the usual problem with
lending institutions. Regional cooperative efforts should promote a sense
of mutual aid and reestablish the diminished community spirit in America's
cities and towns.
